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Abstract 
Open Federalism in an Urban Age: Implications of Recent Trends in 
Intergovernmental Relations for Municipal Governance in Canada 
Timothy R. Mowrey 
Cities are becoming more important in Canada and around the world as a result of 
urbanization and the evolution of the global economy. Everywhere, the emergence of 
pressing urban issues is confronting politicians with difficult policy problems that cut 
across formal jurisdictional lines. In Canada, the importance of cities is challenging the 
traditional intergovernmental arrangements of federalism. But the complex web of 
federal-provincial relationships that have been a feature of Canadian federalism are also 
being challenged by the 'open federalism' approach of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. 
This approach seeks to reduce rather than increase the scope of intergovernmental affairs, 
and suggests that urban issues are not the concern of the federal government since 
municipalities and their problems are the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. Using 
two case studies of key urban issues, public housing and public transportation, this thesis 
examines the evolving intergovernmental arrangements and growing problems in these 
program areas in Canada's three largest cities (Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver). It 
demonstrates that open federalism as an approach to urban issues is not likely to be 
effective. Rather, the overlapping jurisdictional challenges posed by urban issues, 
combined with the limited policy and fiscal resources available to Canadian municipal 
governments, appear to warrant a greater degree of multi-level governance, a finding 
consistent with trends elsewhere. In this regard, an updated version of cooperative 
federalism would seem to allow the federal government the greatest ability to articulate 
i i i 
broad national policy objectives while engaging both provincial and municipal 
governments to ensure adequate and effective program implementation at the local level. 
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I) INTRODUCTION 
Since Confederation, Canada has witnessed a virtual reversal of the rural/urban 
population split. Whereas in 1867 Canada was overwhelmingly rural, today the opposite 
is true. Canada has become an urban nation. Over eighty percent of all Canadians live in 
urban centres, and sixty-three percent live in the largest eighteen cities (see Figure l.l)1. 
Taken as urban regions, the majority of Canada's growth occurred in just four areas: the 
Toronto-Hamilton 'Golden Horseshoe'; Greater Montreal; Vancouver and the Lower 
Mainland of BC, and the Calgary-Edmonton Corridor2. Today, the country's large urban 
centres contain its wealth in human capital, serve as nodes for technology, culture, 
communication, education, and financial transactions, are the economic engines for the 
country and are its links to the global economy. In short, despite its vast geography, 
Canada is now one of the most urban nations in the world. 
The federal system in Canada has not adapted to this new urban reality. 
Currently, 23 cities have larger populations than PEI, and the largest 6 cities have 
populations larger than any of the Maritime Provinces. Thus, cities are not only growing, 
they are growing in relative importance within the federation. Yet municipal 
governments have no role in federal-provincial relations and no constitutional status in 
terms of the division of powers. For many, it appears to be an anachronism that the 
governments of comparably small populations of the Atlantic Provinces have the power 
and authority to negotiate with the federal government and act as equal partners in the 
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institutions of federalism while those of millions of residents of Toronto, Montreal or 
Vancouver do not. Sancton, for instance, reflects on the "tension between the increased 
importance of cities in the global economy and the lowly status" of municipal 
governments in Canada . Moreover, there is a growing recognition that many of the 
current social and economic issues confronting policy makers at all levels of government 
are inherently urban in nature. 
This shift has been apparent for some time. The report of the Federal Task Force 
on Housing and Urban Issues noted in 1969 that urban issues were increasingly important 
and urgent because they affected the vast majority of Canadians4. But little research was 
done at the time to measure the emerging impact of urban centres. More recently, 
however, much work has been devoted to the issue. For example, there is a rapidly 
expanding literature on the growing importance of Canada's urban centres in the global 
economy. Courchene, for instance, points out that city-regions are in ascendance 
globally in an increasingly knowledge-based economy5. Such observations reflect 
Courchene's previous speculation that urban areas were paradoxically becoming more 
important through the processes of globalization - a phenomenon popularly known as 
glocalization - even as the role of individual states declined6. Many others, such as 
Sassen, have documented the linkages between and among key 'world-cities', and 
suggests that these linkages are becoming more important than traditional relationships 
among nation-states7. 
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This emerging view of cities as central to national success and prosperity is 
challenging the traditional approach to Canadian intergovernmental relations. Typically, 
academic research has focussed on relations between the federal and provincial 
governments - hardly surprising given that most powers and revenues are shared between 
them. Municipal governments, by contrast, are largely ignored in the Constitution, and 
are 'creatures' of the provinces by virtue of provincial control over municipal institutions. 
Their legislative authority is limited, and their ability to raise revenues is restricted. Yet 
it is municipal governments that are closest to the unique problems posed by the 
increasing importance of urban centres. Therein lies the paradox: municipal governments 
possess the expertise to most effectively deal with urban problems; provincial 
governments hold the funds and directive authority. Moreover provincial governments 
by and large have demonstrated little appreciation of urban issues, and individual 
provincial responses to the same issue vary widely. Additionally, the federal government 
has both funds and jurisdiction over certain areas of national concern that may in fact be 
occurring primarily in urban areas. 
This overlap of jurisdictional authority and policy complexity has generated 
significant interest in the potential responses from higher levels of government to the 
challenges facing municipal authorities. More specifically, there is a growing argument 
for a concerted national (i.e. federal government) approach to urban affairs. In 2002, a 
Liberal Caucus Task Force reported on the urban challenges facing the nation, urging the 
federal government to take more direct action to address urban issues8. The Conference 
Board of Canada recently published an extensive report on urban concerns, concluding 
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that the state of Canada's major cities should be a national priority9. A special advisory 
committee appointed by Paul Martin reported similar findings10. To many, the question 
appears to be the appropriate degree of centralization or decentralization in the Canadian 
federation - who should responsible for what, and who pays? 
Such questions of jurisdiction and the proper approach to urban affairs are not 
unique to Canada. Urbanization is a global phenomenon, and urban centres around the 
world are challenging the traditional notions of governance. It appears that many 
countries have begun to act on their urban realities, and have adopted a number of 
measures to both better equip municipal governments and to involve other levels of 
government in the solutions to urban problems. As Leuprecht & Lazar note, 'multi-level 
governance' structures that involve municipal governments are becoming the norm in 
many countries, and intergovernmental relationships that involve all levels of government 
are increasingly pervasive11. 
For a time, Canada appeared to be following this trend. While provincial 
governments pursued wildly different approaches, the federal government took 
incremental steps in the mid 1990s to begin to address Canada's urban reality. The 1993 
tri-level Infrastructure Canada program, for example, sought to provide federal funding to 
municipally designated projects that were subject to provincial approval. Implemented 
by the Chretien government as a direct result of lobbying from the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities (FCM), it was so successful that it was extended in 1997 and 
2000. In 2002, Prime Minister Chretien appointed a Liberal Caucus Task Force to study 
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urban issues, and in 2004, the Martin government expanded the ambit of its urban 
involvement through the New Deal for Cities and Communities The New Deal allocated 
a small portion of the federal gas tax to municipal governments provided they met 
federally stipulated conditions. To consider the way forward beyond the New Deal, Prime 
Minister Martin also appointed an External Advisory Committee on Cities and 
Communities, which reported in 2006. Chaired by former Vancouver Mayor and B.C. 
Premier Mike Harcourt, the report unequivocally called for greater federal involvement in 
urban affairs, and for all levels of government to collaborate in the development of policy 
solutions. 
While the new Conservative government of Stephen Harper has maintained the 
New Deal provisions for the moment, and extended several other provisions for 
infrastructure funding, their approach to intergovernmental relations and to urban affairs 
generally appears to be fundamentally different from previous Liberal governments. 
Under Prime Minister Harper's vision of 'open federalism', the Conservatives now 
propose a reduction in the scope of the federal government, disentangling from 
commitments outside its direct, formal jurisdiction. In this sense, the approach advocated 
is a return to a stricter, pre-World War II reading of the constitutional division of powers, 
with fewer intergovernmental administrative agreements and networks rather than more. 
As Prime Minister Harper has stated, he believes Ottawa has "stuck its nose into 
provincial and local matters, into areas where [it] didn't have much expertise, while at the 
same time neglecting what it had to do" . The Prime Minister's comments were echoed 
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recently by his Finance Minister, Jim Flaherty, who responded to municipal requests for 
greater funding by arguing that "Ottawa is not in the pothole business".13 
Given this background, my thesis will address one main research question, 
namely whether 'open federalism' is likely to be an effective intergovernmental 
framework in terms of solving the problems presented by Canada's urban centres. To do 
so I will first examine the historical evolution of federalism in Canada since the end of 
WWII, when intergovernmental arrangements became widespread, and in particular the 
evolution of intergovernmental relationships between and among the federal, provincial 
and municipal governments in Canada. Using a qualitative approach I will then employ 
two case studies, namely public housing and public transportation, to illustrate how 
federalism and intergovernmental relations since the early 1990s have impacted Canada's 
three largest urban centres (Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver). This timeframe has been 
selected in order to highlight the contrasting federal and provincial approaches to these 
two key policy areas before the 1995 federal budget (where many argue the downloading 
exercise exacerbated urban problems), and after, since this period witnessed the 
development of some of the most important features leading to the current open 
federalism approach. The likelihood that open federalism will be an effective framework 
can be assessed against the record established by the results of the collaborative 
federalism framework that was in place for much of the period under review here, 
particularly in contrast to the lessons of the cooperative federalism of the immediate post-
war period. 
6 
Public housing and public transportation have been selected for the case studies 
for several reasons. First, they are major policy concerns for municipal governments, and 
both areas currently involve provincial and federal governments to varying degrees 
across the country. Secondly, both are important indicators of urban and national health 
that have seen remarkable policy changes in the past several decades. As a result, they 
offer a significant breadth of evidence that reflects the differing municipal and provincial 
responses to date. A close examination of the respective intergovernmental arrangements 
in these two key sectors will demonstrate the inevitable interdependence and overlap of 
such social policy areas for all levels of government, and the likely impact of an open 
federalism approach. 
Additionally, public transportation is a policy solution to many other national 
policy objectives. Achieving environmental goals, for example, relies in large part on the 
ability of all governments to develop and expand public transportation in our large urban 
centres. As well, a city's ability to effectively and efficiently move its citizens between 
home, work and leisure activities is central to economic competitiveness and overall 
quality of life - for the city in question but also for Canada as a whole. 
In order to determine the appropriateness of open federalism in the context of 
municipal governance it will be necessary to develop a baseline from which to measure 
its impact. Open federalism is too new to assess its overall impact as a framework for 
intergovernmental relations, but the likely efficacy of open federalism can be measured 
against emerging criteria for policy success in the areas of public housing and transit. 
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Particular policy goals for housing and transportation have been applied to measure the 
success or failure of previous policy initiatives. For example, a number of observers, 
including the FCM and the Canadian Urban Transit Association (CUTA), have not only 
suggested that any approach to these issues must meet a number of discrete policy goals 
to be successful, but have also advocated for national strategies in both policy areas under 
question. More broadly, a number of observers have long argued that success in these 
areas requires stable long-term funding, and an overall policy orientation that contributes 
to reducing the scope of the problems. The research question therefore can specifically 
ask whether municipal governments and their respective provincial governments will be 
able to produce programs and services that meet these policy goals in the face of a 
federal retrenchment from urban policy areas. 
It is also important to note that, while housing and transportation policy have been 
selected to illustrate federal-provincial-municipal interactions, they represent only a small 
portion of the policy areas that are problems for urban areas and hence for municipal 
governments. Infrastructure (apart from transportation infrastructure) is also a 
challenging area of urban public policy, but is too broad a topic and is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Looking at solely transportation, then, effectively hives off an important 
and uniquely urban element of the infrastructure issue, and should produce evidence that 
can be applied more broadly to the entire family of infrastructure-related policy areas. 
Other policy areas, such as environmental sustainability and economic development/ 
competitiveness, are often treated as stand-alone areas for analysis, but in the context of 
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this analysis they represent policy outcomes for the more concrete examples of public 
housing and transportation. 
The two case studies will focus on the experiences of Canada's three largest urban 
areas: Greater Toronto, Greater Montreal and Greater Vancouver. As the major urban 
centres in Canada they are most affected by the intergovernmental structures that shape 
housing and transportation policy. It is also noteworthy that these three cities receive the 
vast majority of immigrants in Canada, currently our greatest source of population 
growth. Recent data suggests that, at least temporarily, immigrants tend to place greater 
demands on the housing and transportation systems of the cities in which they settle. 
Most important for the case studies, these three cities also represent three different 
provincial policy responses towards municipalities. Toronto is an example of 
confrontational municipal-provincial relations due to the amount of policy activity and 
the city's status as the largest of Canada's municipalities. Montreal offers insight into the 
additional challenges of governing a large urban centre in Quebec, where federal 
encroachment into provincial jurisdiction is most vociferously rejected, but where 
provincial governments have generally recognized the city's primacy in the province. 
Finally, Vancouver's intergovernmental structures have witnessed the least amount of 
controversy and generally avoided jurisdictional disputes, although there has been a trend 
towards greater 'provincialization'. This unique regional government system is often 
lauded as a model for other jurisdictions. 
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A comparative analysis of the approach taken in other relevant federal states 
(Germany and the United States, as well as the European Union), and a unitary state with 
extensive regional and local administrative structures, France, over the same period 
should also provide a useful context in which to evaluate the new federal approach. 
It is expected that a detailed analysis of these two key policy areas in Canada's 
three main urban centres will confirm what my preliminary research already indicates: 
open federalism is not likely to be an effective intergovernmental framework to respond 
to important urban issues. 
It is anticipated that the combined evidence presented through the historical 
review and the case studies will show that earlier provincial experiments in 
'disentanglement' have generally failed to achieve their stated objectives, and have done 
nothing to advance solutions to complex urban problems. The research is expected to 
show that open federalism's focus on watertight jurisdictional compartments does not 
reflect the growing interdependence of urban policy problems, and does not accurately 
reflect the importance of municipal governance in a new global economy. More broadly, 
I expect to find that open federalism has not taken lessons from previous periods of 
federalism in Canada. Intergovernmental collaboration has returned few positive results 
in the absence of any federal leadership, and it appears unlikely that municipal 
governments will see any positive or sustained change in their collective circumstances if 
simply left to their provincial masters. In this regard, an open federalism that relies on 
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strong, independent provinces to achieve national goals is likely to be the wrong 
approach for an urban age. 
I expect to find a divergence between open federalism and national government 
initiatives elsewhere. In particular, I expect to find that Europe is already progressing to 
greater recognition of their urban reality, and structures to accommodate urban voices 
and concerns are emerging and solidifying. A move to subsidiarity is likely to be 
occurring regardless of whether the state is a federation, unitary state, or supra-national 
organization such as the European Union. In the United States, it is likely that the wide 
state-level differentiation of policies towards cities will make it difficult to glean many 
lessons, but that in key areas such as housing and transportation, significant federal 
involvement - primarily monetary - has become the norm. 
As an alternative to open federalism, I expect to find that strong arguments exist 
for a return to an updated form of cooperative federalism, where federal leadership 
provides for broad national standards and objectives, but remains sensitive to jurisdiction 
and particular provincial/municipal circumstances. Based on preliminary research, it 
appears an explicit national urban policy (or policies) is warranted to provide broad 
direction and coherence towards national goals. By articulating broad directions, the 
federal government could allow provinces and municipalities significant policy 
experimentation while simultaneously recognizing the importance of urban issues in 
determining overall national health. A formal devolution of power is likely not an option 
in the Canadian context, but developing mutual policy goals that involve the expertise 
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and funding mechanisms of all levels of government appears to be a workable approach. 
Such changes in approach do not require substantial reforms to the structure of Canadian 
federalism, and would continue to the tradition of successful non-constitutional renewal. 
This paper is organized as follows: to set the context, Chapter II provides a brief 
review of intergovernmental relations in Canada, tracing their evolution over time and 
focussing on the post-WWII era. The next Chapter specifically addresses the nature and 
scope of open federalism as proposed by the current federal government. Chapter IV 
then details the relationship between municipal governments and the federal and 
provincial levels. This chapter also highlights the relevant literature on fiscal federalism 
and the nature of the fiscal arrangements between and among all levels of government. 
Based on these important contextual chapters, Chapter V contains the case studies 
themselves. Beginning with an overview of the range of issues facing urban 
governments, the chapter examines the specific issues of public transportation and 
housing and the policy responses from governments to date. Chapter V provides 
international comparisons to show how other countries have adapted to address urban 
issues and to demonstrate how greater intergovernmental cooperation - not less - has 
emerged elsewhere as the preferred response. Finally, Chapter VI will discuss the results 
of my analysis and provide some tentative conclusions about the likely impact of open 
federalism on municipal governance and the resolution of key urban issues. 
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II) THE EVOLUTION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 
After a brief discussion of relevant federal theories, this chapter focuses on the 
evolution of federal-provincial relations. Such an overview is necessary because, as we 
shall see, federalism in Canada has been dynamic, fluid, and flexible. When responding 
to exogenous forces - whether political, social or economic - the processes of 
intergovernmental relations have adapted. Thus, there is a history of successful 
adaptations (as well as some spectacular failures) on which to base the analysis of the 
prospects for open federalism with respect to municipal governance. The particular 
lessons that relate to urban issues and governance can be found in all stages of Canadian 
federalism, both in terms of what could be done and what should be avoided. As this 
overview demonstrates, open federalism stands as somewhat unique, since the driving 
force behind this new direction appears to be solely political (or more precisely, 
ideological), rather than a combination of social, economic and political pressures that 
have shaped previous eras. 
1) Federal Theory 
At its simplest, federalism refers to a structure of government where sub-national, 
territorially-based units share power with a national government. This definition is 
incomplete, however, given that federalism is as much about process as it is structure. 
Within these structures are processes that include venues for negotiation, fiscal 
arrangements, informal associations, and inter-jurisdictional policy making. The 
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diversity sometimes fostered by federal systems adds another layer of informal process, 
through which regional or municipal groups might have a voice. The precise 
mechanisms for the separation of power and authority, and the relations between the 
national and sub-national (including municipal) units vary considerably among federal 
states. The distribution of powers between levels of government in a federation naturally 
involves questions of financing, as well as the equality of treatment of sub-national units 
by the federal government, and there is no one set of'federal rules' among states in this 
regard. 
Thus, federalism is more than just the sum of its parts; it is a structure of 
government combined with processes of governance that add up to a "complex stew"14 of 
values that prop up an entire way of life. Federal systems often develop a federal 
mindset, continually aware of the need to protect sub-national authority while remaining 
committed to a larger national state. Problems and solutions are viewed through this lens 
- a jurisdictional lens that can, at times, turn to bickering and postulating among levels of 
government. But, each level can admit to a certain degree of interdependence within an 
otherwise autonomous sphere . 
All federal systems are, therefore, analyzed by the degree to which they can be 
said to be centralized or decentralized. In this regard, it is not only important to assess 
the division of legislative authority, but also the fiscal arrangements. Indeed, there is a 
literature devoted to 'fiscal federalism' that studies the mechanisms through with federal 
systems collect, transfer and spend tax dollars16. In many cases these mechanisms do not 
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correspond to the legislative authority of each unit. For example, it is often the case that 
greater tax levers are available to, or occupied by, the federal government, while the bulk 
of program spending needs rest with the sub-national units. This so-called 'vertical fiscal 
imbalance' leads to negotiations among governments over the precise nature of those 
transfers. As new issues arise and political circumstances change, the fiscal arrangements 
that underpin fiscal federalism also change, and can move between centralized and 
decentralized. 
Thus, as Friedrich noted, to be successful federalism must be dynamic; the 
processes by which the structures of federalism are made to work must be fluid, flexible, 
and undergoing constant change . A brief review of intergovernmental relations in 
Canada highlights this fact. The test of the effectiveness and appropriateness of any of 
the periods of Canadian federalism could be an assessment of its ability to effectively 
meet the policy objectives of governments and the program delivery needs of Canadians. 
For example, the processes of intergovernmental relations adapted in the post WWII era 
as a result of public pressure for government intervention led to the creation of the 
welfare state. This was achieved through the creation of national programs with 
provincial implementation, programs that have become deeply entrenched and have 
undergone remarkably little substantive change to the processes that allow for their 
delivery and execution. 
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2) Canadian federalism in operation 
For a variety of reasons, both political and socio-cultural, the framers of the 
Canadian constitution created a federal structure which lacked some of the 'essential' 
features defined by Wheare . Indeed, the absence of an amending formula, the specific 
allocation of certain shared powers (as opposed to 'watertight' jurisdictions), and the 
recourse to an external source of judicial review (the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in London), led Wheare to characterize Canada as a 'quasi-federal' country. 
Nevertheless, as Riker concluded, Canada soon operated as a federal system19. All of 
these exceptions to the classic federal model would prove central to the evolution of 
Canadian intergovernmental relations. Unable to amend the constitution, for example, 
federal and provincial governments have opted to negotiate administrative agreements to 
achieve their policy objectives. 
Canadian federalism has therefore been marked by periods of 'cooperative', 
'collaborative', 'competitive' and 'executive' intergovernmental relations. The major 
debate historically has been over the appropriate role of the federal government in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction, with Ottawa attempting to assert its desire to govern for all of 
Canada, and provinces resisting federal encroachment into their constitutionally-
mandated areas of authority. Rather than strict 'watertight' jurisdictions, Canadian 
federalism has developed into an integrated and conjoined system of governance. Indeed, 
some experts argue that intergovernmental relations have become the "defining 
characteristic" of Canadian governance20. 
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The evolution of these processes, however, has not been a straight line. The 
recent move towards 'open federalism' in Canada represents yet another innovation in the 
processes of Canadian federalism, one of a long line of attempts to work around the 
structures of the federation as outlined in the Constitution. And, while none of these 
various post-war approaches demonstrates a federal approach to municipalities per se, 
they do indicate the willingness of the federal government to become involved in affairs 
outside its immediate jurisdiction in the name of the national interest. They also 
demonstrate, to quote Courchene, the "incredible flexibility"21 of Canadian federalism to 
respond to new pressures without fundamentally altering the basic structures of the 
federation. 
Classic federalism: A Bygone Era 
Canada was not always a nation characterized by intricate and flexible 
intergovernmental relations. As Simeon and Robinson (1990) point out, Canada came to 
resemble a classic federal state shortly after Confederation in 1867, despite the founders' 
intentions. While Canada was initially conceived as a centralized federation, several 
judgements at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London tilted the union in 
favour of the provinces and promoted the notion of provincial sovereignty. The absence 
of a strongly developed national character meant that Canada soon resembled the classic, 
American tradition of federalism, with roughly watertight jurisdictions and little 
penetration of the federal government into provincial affairs. This trend was reinforced 
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by the fact that the demands placed on both levels of government were minimal, allowing 
the two levels to operate in isolation without difficulty. 
However, the Great Depression changed the nature of Canadian federalism by 
changing the ways in which Canadians saw the federal government and their expectations 
99 
for government programs and services . Economics and social well-being began to 
drive federal debates. The role of the state, then, became a central question, and reform 
movements across the country began to argue for an increased state presence in the 
nation's economy and society. But, with many of the key areas of jurisdiction assigned 
to the provinces while the federal government had the greater revenue raising capacity, 
both levels of government were required to work together, abandoning the concept of 
watertight jurisdictional compartments. 
Cooperative federalism: The 'Golden Age' 
The post-war era ushered in a period of 'cooperative federalism', where federal 
leadership and provincial cooperation became hallmarks. The development of a post-war 
Keynesian welfare state was in large part driven by the federal government, both in terms 
of policy initiatives and financing. The provinces occasionally voiced opposition, but 
were at other times essential to the successful implementation of programs (such as 
equalization, unemployment insurance and old-age security) or for initiating programs 
that were taken up later by the federal government (such as Medicare). Tax collection 
agreements and conditional grants to facilitate the welfare state expanded the scope of the 
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federal government such that Canada became more centralized than at any time since the 
nation building efforts immediately following Confederation . The previous era of 
'layer cake' federalism in Canada had been transformed into 'marble cake' federalism. 
Yet this fundamental restructuring of the relationship between the federal 
government and the provinces involved no formal changes to the distribution of powers; 
rather, of necessity it took place in the realm of administrative process. Cooperative 
federalism marked the federal government's broad use of its greater spending power to 
accomplish what it could not otherwise do if it had adhered to the strict letter of the 
constitution. Absent an amending formula, negotiations between the two levels of 
government were necessary to achieve the objective of minimum national standards for 
provincially administered programs. 
Cooperative federalism also marked the entrenchment of asymmetrical federalism 
as a process in Canada, as the federal government began to accommodate Quebec's 
resistance to federal intrusion in its areas of jurisdiction. Notably, Quebec opted to 
establish its own income tax in the mid 1950s, to which Ottawa responded by making tax 
room available. While the federal government collects income tax on behalf of all other 
provinces, Quebec collects its own. Structural asymmetry, rather than program 
asymmetry, has been a feature of Canadian federalism from the beginning, and the 
evolution of federal processes to meet certain provincial demands, allowing them to opt 
out of federal programs, demonstrates the flexibility of Canadian federalism24. The key 
to the approach taken in this period was that asymmetry appeared only in the context of 
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implementation - there was no asymmetry in the program goals or national standards. 
Where provinces chose to opt out of a federal program, they did not simultaneously opt 
out of that program's intended outcomes. Federal goals and expectations remained 
symmetrical, but provinces could choose their specific approaches to deliver them. 
There are two important lessons from this period. First, the federation can 
withstand an approach that does not advocate one-size-fits-all. Broad national policy 
objectives can be articulated without paternalistic, top-down parameters for provincial 
programs designed to meet these objectives. Second, cooperative federalism was 
specifically designed to address regional disparity by creating national programs. Indeed, 
the inability of some provinces to pay for many of the elements of the welfare state - the 
existence of a horizontal fiscal imbalance - was a driving factor behind the federal 
government's efforts to effectively ensure programs could be delivered in all parts of the 
country. 
Despite (or because of) its successes, the period of cooperative federalism had 
unintended consequences which made it increasingly difficult for the federal government 
to exercise leadership and expect provincial acquiescence. To begin with, the increasing 
size of the federal state was being replicated at the provincial level, with provincial 
bureaucracies growing to meet the demands of administering new social programs. With 
significant state apparatus of their own, provinces became more vocal players in the 
development of federal policy. In addition, cooperative federalism had been able to 
respond to the problems and pressures of the welfare state effectively, such that attention 
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began to focus on other matters that had been shelved during the immediate post-war 
years. Regional concerns, Quebec's role in the federation (driven by the Quiet 
Revolution), and the mechanisms through which this new found interdependence 
occurred came into question again. The demands of cooperation necessarily meant that 
federal and provincial governments would work more closely together, and 
accommodating these working relationships led to procedural innovations such as regular 
First Ministers meetings and the creation in a number of jurisdictions of new ministries 
for intergovernmental affairs. These changes effectively spelled the end of cooperative 
federalism by the mid-1960s. In its wake, an era of executive federalism, or 'federal-
provincial diplomacy'25, was ushered in. 
Executive federalism: Intergovernmental Diplomacy 
Executive federalism refers to the increasing use of federal and provincial 
leadership to conduct the business of managing interdependency. Unlike cooperative 
federalism, which was largely driven by bureaucratic interfaces, executive federalism 
involved direct participation of and negotiation by the Prime Minister and Premiers. It is 
both celebrated and dismissed, sometimes simultaneously. For some, executive 
federalism enabled many of the successes of the later cooperative federalism period. For 
others, executive federalism has had disastrous consequences. Donald Smiley, for 
example, argues strongly that executive federalism fosters secrecy, shuts out public 
participation, weakens government accountability, and leads to unnecessary conflicts 
among governments26. 
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At the time these critiques were levelled, executive federalism had not yet 
produced the Constitution Act 1982, the Meech Lake Agreement, or the Charlottetown 
Accord. While the Constitution Act was successful, in part due to threats of unilateralism 
by the federal government, the failures of Meech and Charlottetown brought executive 
federalism under even harsher criticism. As Brooke Jeffrey notes, the decade of 
intergovernmental affairs under the Mulroney Conservatives "left executive federalism 
thoroughly discredited" . Nevertheless, some authors who are willing to concede both 
the successes and failures of executive federalism admit that it is a permanent feature of 
Canadian federalism28. The existence of the Council of the Federation, comprised of 
provincial premiers, in addition to the more established First Minister's meetings appears 
to be evidence of this fact. Municipally, there appears to be a similar phenomenon, as 
'Big City Mayors' are increasing seen as the primary interlocutors with provincial 
premiers and the Prime Minister. Thus, the question has become how Canadian 
federalism will evolve to recognize the limits of executive federalism while accepting its 
presence as a fact. 
Collaborative Federalism: More Talk than Action 
In an attempt to distance himself from the soured notion of executive federalism, 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien came to power in 1993 promising new relations between 
the federal government and the provinces. However, whatever the plans for this new 
relationship were, they became guided by several factors that ultimately produced 
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'collaborative federalism', a form of federal process that sowed the seeds for open 
federalism. Faced with an enormous federal debt load, rising Quebec nationalism, and a 
new party system, Chretien opted to reduce the scope of the federal government in the 
early years of his mandate. The decentralization that accompanied the 1995 federal 
budget, where massive spending cuts were coupled with a reduction in the number of 
conditions applied to federal transfers to the provinces. Since the federal government no 
longer assumed primary funding responsibility for many programs, the imposition of 
national standards was questioned by many provinces. Notwithstanding the fact that 
many provinces replicated the federal efforts with their own municipalities -
downloading responsibilities and funding authority without relinquishing the right to 
impose conditions - provincial premiers criticized the federal government and began 
demanding a new, collaborative approach to Canadian social policy. The existence of a 
neo-liberal federal opposition (Reform), as well as in the governments of Ontario and 
Alberta, who advocated forcefully for a reduction in state involvement in a number of 
social policy areas, further facilitated the road to collaborative federalism. Despite the 
federal government's success in eliminating the deficit and attempts to return to an era of 
using the federal (surplus) spending power to shape Canadian social and economic 
policy, the federal government was unable to shift the decentralizing momentum 
generated by its 1995 budget. 
Thus, in 1999 a framework agreement called the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA) was signed by the federal government and all provinces except 
Quebec. It is perhaps the document that best reflects the objectives of collaborative 
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federalism. The agreement sought to formalize the emerging collaborative federalism 
position, effectively saying that federal leadership was not assumed, but rather close 
relationships among equal, non-hierarchical levels of government would produce 
consensus on policy issues. Governments committed to consult one another on policy 
changes, and to increase accountability through reporting. The federal spending power in 
areas of provincial jurisdiction was not squashed, but rather limited by requiring 
provincial consent and consultation. In this sense, the question was not whether the 
federation would move towards centralization or decentralization, but rather towards 
efficiency and collaboration, allowing for policy experimentation and the sharing of best 
practices across jurisdictions. 
At the time, collaborative federalism and the SUFA were hailed as a fresh and 
dynamic approach to the processes of federalism in Canada. Stephane Dion, the federal 
Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs, called it a "new and promising approach for 
managing interdependence"29. Yet collaborative federalism was less a vision and more a 
reluctant response on the part of the federal government. It has therefore been plagued by 
inaction and outright ignorance. The federal government, flush with cash and looking to 
resume its commitments on social policy, pursued unilateral policies aimed at individuals 
to by-pass the provinces, including the National Child Benefit, and the Millennium 
Scholarship Fund. The provinces have reacted at times with their own unilateralism, 
refusing to take up federal cash offers, clawing back any benefits received from federal 
funding, and generally not fulfilling reporting and accountability requirements laid out 
the in the agreement. Thus the real outcome of collaborative federalism has been a 'dual 
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unilateralism', where both levels of government talk glowingly about collaboration while 
ultimately going their own ways on social policy30. Subsequent social policy agreements, 
such as the 2000 and 2003 health accords, have failed to even reference the SUFA. 
For many, the unfulfilled expectation of collaborative federalism and the SUFA 
were to be expected, since the idea of collaborative government - in the sense that it was 
presented - ran against conventional practice and political necessities. As Delacourt and 
Lenihan point out, collaborative relationships require a willingness to share decision 
making authority and a long-term outlook - both requirements that are difficult to meet 
given different mandates, political stripes, and regional needs . Cameron and Simeon 
point out the acrimonious ideology-driven negotiations between Ontario and Ottawa 
regarding labour-force training that appears to back up these assertions32. The former 
Auditor General of Canada not surprisingly raised concerns about the ability of 
collaborative government to meet accountability requirements, since goals may be 
unclear among participants and more players are involved . Moreover, the SUFA and 
collaborative federalism more generally have fallen into the executive federalism trap -
negotiated behind closed doors with little public input. Executive federalism also 
involves both levels of government protecting their areas of jurisdiction, seeking credit 
and passing blame, often to win political points at home. If collaborative federalism is to 
be linked with the SUFA, therefore, it would be deemed a failure. As Roger Gibbins 
wryly observes, "if SUFA were to die, few Canadians would notice the obituary, much 
less mourn its passing"34. 
In the later days of collaborative federalism the federal government indicated a 
renewed willingness to extend the federal spending power into areas of provincial 
jurisdiction. The problem with the approach taken was its significant degree of 
asymmetry. Far from collaboration, the tack taken by the Martin Liberals has been a 
series of one-off deals on a number of policy issues, ranging from equalization 
agreements to child care agreements. This appeared to mark the abandonment of 
traditional asymmetry (in the form of opting out with compensation) for a negotiated, or 
'treaty' form of federalism . The result is a patchwork of policies, and little sense of 
national standards. 
At the same time, the federal government began to show a renewed and expanded 
interest in asserting itself into areas traditionally outside its jurisdiction and announced a 
return to urban affairs. Building on existing infrastructure programs, Finance Minister 
Paul Martin announced his intention to develop a 'New Deal' for Canada's cities, 
including a refund on GST payments and sharing a portion of the federal gas tax. When 
it was announced in 2004, after Martin had become Prime Minister, the plan was 
implemented using individual agreements with the provinces based on general guidelines. 
These included general stipulations that the funding should be used for sustainable 
infrastructure such as green technology and public transit. 
The point to be made here is that the federal government did not chose to create a 
federal program to which provinces could opt in or out, but rather struck agreements with 
provinces individually, similar to its approach to the child care agreements. This 
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approach, as will be demonstrated later, did not lead to a reduction in the disparity among 
provinces in terms of program delivery. In fact, in some cases provinces chose to take up 
federal offers for cost-sharing agreements and in others they did not. Unlike cooperative 
federalism, which took the horizontal imbalance into consideration and sought to reduce 
the gap in program delivery capacity among provinces, collaborative federalism led to an 
increase in unilateral action and greater disparity. In this sense collaborative federalism 
most closely resembles the open federalism approach advocated by Prime Minister 
Harper. 
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Ill) OPEN VS. DEEP FEDERALISM 
The recent shift to what he has termed 'open federalism' by Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper has arrived on the heels of this somewhat mixed record for collaborative 
federalism. In some ways open federalism appears to build on several of the 
developments of the collaborative federalism period, but it also incorporates strong 
positions linking it back to the classic federalism of the pre-WWII era. Given its very 
recent addition to the Canadian federal discourse, much ambiguity remains regarding the 
specifics. The term 'open' itself raises many questions. It is possible, however, to sketch 
an outline of the main characteristics of open federalism based on the Conservative 
Party's platform, statements, and approach to governing. Political Scientist Robert 
Young has developed such a sketch, and argues that open federalism comprises six key 
components36. First, open federalism seeks to establish order in intergovernmental affairs 
by discontinuing ad hoc arrangements or one-off deals. Harper's position on the Liberal 
approach, particularly under Paul Martin, was clear. As early as 2004 he complained that 
the Liberal government was pursuing "ad hoc arrangements after chaotic 
intergovernmental meetings"37. The Conservatives saw the Liberal approach as 
scattershot, unprincipled, and beyond the competencies of the federal government. 
Second, open federalism envisages strong provinces . Without acknowledging 
that Canadian provinces are among the strongest sub-national units among federal states 
in the world, the Conservatives had criticized Liberal "attacks" on the provinces. In their 
campaign platform, the Harper Conservatives went even further and promised a 'Charter 
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on Open Federalism', designed to formalize the involvement of the provinces in areas of 
federal jurisdiction where provinces also had an interest . 
Third, open federalism seeks a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the 
federal and provincial governments as per the division of powers in the constitution. In 
this sense, open federalism harkens back to the classic federalism of Canada's by-gone 
era. It is perhaps this element of open federalism that breaks most from the history of 
federalism compiled since WWII. Rather than recognize the role the federal government 
can play in achieving national objectives by working cooperatively with provinces, the 
aim here is to remove the federal government from areas it does not belong according to 
the constitution. Harper is on record stating that he'd like to see "Ottawa do what the 
federal government is supposed to do"40, and focus its attention to the constitutionally 
assigned areas of national defence and international relations. These sentiments were 
echoed months later in a Harper speech to the Federation of Canadian municipalities, 
where he stated that he felt Ottawa had "stuck its nose into provincial and local matters, 
into areas where they didn't have much expertise, while at the same time neglecting what 
it had to do"41. The idea is that if Ottawa more effectively executed its constitutional 
duties, provinces could better discharge their responsibilities with less interference. 
Fourth, the Conservatives have made a special case for rectifying the fiscal 
imbalance, and this too is taken to be a component of open federalism. For the 
Conservatives, the vertical fiscal imbalance exists and must be addressed, despite some 
evidence to the contrary42. Their 2006 campaign platform suggested a Conservative 
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government would seek to permanently fix the fiscal imbalance through a comprehensive 
agreement. In their first Speech from the Throne in 2006, the Conservatives echoed their 
platform, promising to "ensure fiscal arrangements in which all governments have access 
to the resources they need to meet their responsibilities". So far, proposals for reducing 
the fiscal imbalance include increasing transfers, reforming equalization, federal tax 
reductions to leave room for the provinces, and/or transferring tax points to the provinces. 
Fifth, despite the first element of open federalism, which seems to advocate 
equality of treatment for all provinces, and despite a longstanding western tradition of 
supporting provincial equality within the federation, open federalism proposes special 
treatment of Quebec. It is unclear what exactly the long-term affects of this treatment 
will be, but at present the Conservative's open federalism subscribes to the view that 
Quebec is distinct within Canada. In the 2006 election, as Young outlines, the 
Conservative Party acknowledged the "special cultural and institutional responsibilities" 
of Quebec43. This approach was given more concrete terms, albeit under some duress, 
when the Harper Conservatives officially recognized the Quebecois as a nation within 
Canada. 
Finally, and importantly, open federalism means that municipalities are seen as 
falling exclusively within provincial jurisdiction. In keeping with several other elements 
presented here, open federalism views the federal government's responsibility for 
municipalities as extremely limited. While not outright abandoning municipalities (the 
Conservatives have promised to retain the New Deal commitments to share a portion of 
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the federal gas tax), it is their intention to reduce the scope and breadth of the federal 
government's activities as much as possible. As Harper lamented in 2006, "Ottawa has 
gotten into everything in recent years, not just provincial jurisdiction but now municipal 
jurisdiction"44. Perhaps this element is best viewed as the cumulative affect of the 
previous elements (with the exception of the treatment of Quebec); if the federal 
government brings order to intergovernmental arrangements, facilitates strong provinces, 
reduces the fiscal imbalance, and returns to the constitutional separation of powers, 
provinces and municipalities will be better equipped to deal with their own problems in 
manners as they see fit. Or so the argument seems to go. 
There are some optimists among the early reviewers of open federalism. Simeon, 
for example, argues that open federalism's attempt to distance itself from the top-down 
approach of previous processes is welcome, given that provincial and - to a growing 
extent - municipal officials are equally professional and committed to effective service 
delivery 5. He also points out that the constitution and convention in Canada places the 
federal government and the provinces on an equal footing in so far as policy making is 
concerned. Committing to excel at areas within their respective areas of jurisdiction 
better recognizes this fact. Noel points out that open federalism has the benefit of 
simplicity, which can make it appealing46. Banting notes that open federalism's newness 
and lack of specificities in a number of areas demonstrates the success of'creative 
ambiguity' in Canadian federalism47. 
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There are also some pessimists, or at least some who are more cautious in their 
optimism. Leslie suggests that pursuing open federalism to its logical extreme may 
undercut the federation, leaving the federal government unable to affect national policy in 
the face of strong provinces . Ottawa would not know when to engage in provincial 
policy - and press for that engagement - and when to sit it out. Such circumstances 
could leave the federal government "rudderless in turbulent seas"49. Indeed, such 
circumstances point to one of the enduring difficulties of collaborative federalism, where 
governments were required to give up some decision making authority over areas they 
might well wish to play a role in. There are no guarantees that, failing to arrive at a 
policy consensus or an inability to share long-term policy goals, jurisdictions would not 
again turn to unilateralism. 
As well, the Conservative portrayal of open federalism overlooks many factors. 
For instance, there is by no means agreement on the issue of fiscal imbalance, nor does 
the approach acknowledge the positive aspects of the federal spending power. Federal 
governments in the past have used the federal spending power to create programs that are 
now entrenched in the Canadian psyche, such as universal health care. Similarly, the 
focus on 'disentanglement' overlooks several previous attempts to sort out governmental 
responsibilities, including the failed Meech Lake Agreement and Charlottetown Accord 
(as well as less publicized program review initiatives), not to mention similar failed 
exercises in several provinces. Open federalism's approach to Quebec may be welcome 
in terms of potentially placating Quebec nationalism, but it is difficult to assess the 
potential impact on western alienation, given the west's traditional advocacy for 
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provincial equality. Finally, it should be remembered that collaborative federalism also 
took as one of its driving impulses the need to streamline government and become more 
efficient in program delivery, with sadly mixed results. In fact, Jeffrey argues that it has 
had the opposite affect50. While efficiency and efficacy are certainly worthwhile goals, it 
remains unclear whether it can be achieved through the collaborative mechanisms 
envisioned in open federalism. Some have even argued that efforts to streamline 
government by eliminating overlap are misguided. Overlap should not be viewed as 
necessarily wasteful, but rather a natural feature of complex systems, particularly systems 
dealing with complex public policy issues51. 
For others, open federalism appears to run against the current needs of Canada's 
urban centres, as well as against the emerging consensus among urban observers. It 
appears to ignore the emerging place of Canada's cities in both the national and 
international order. It assumes that the provinces will effectively discharge their 
responsibilities toward municipalities, when evidence seems to point to the contrary (see 
Chapters IV & V). It assumes that the problems and challenges of our urban centres are 
not of national, or federal, interest. It appears to be constructed for a simpler time, or -
more cynically - to offer "don't-hurt-my-head solutions to complex social problems"52. 
Indeed, the simplicity of open federalism belies the complex processes and issues 
confronting our cities. 
For example, the fiscal squeeze confronting Canadian municipalities is occurring 
at an important juncture in the evolution of the global economy. As Courchene argues, 
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economic power is paradoxically being pulled into a global economy driven by a series of 
global city regions . This combination has been termed 'glocahzation', where economic 
imperatives often transcend national borders while at the same time becoming focussed in 
large urban regions. These urban regions are not geographically based in the same sense 
that defined them in previous eras; Saskatchewan's urban connection to the global 
economy is arguably Vancouver (or Calgary), while for residents of Syracuse, NY, it may 
be Toronto. Traditional boundaries are rendered meaningless in such circumstances. In 
addition, the economy is being driven by different resources than previously. Ours is no 
longer a resource based economy, but a knowledge-based economy. In such an economic 
environment, human capital becomes more important, and the ability of cities to attract 
and retain such talent is key not only to their success but, by extension, to national 
prosperity as well. Richard Florida has argued that the 'creative class' have important 
roles to play in creating environments that foster economic growth in cities54. Cities that 
are tolerant, technologically advanced, and talented have an advantage in the knowledge 
based economy where place of residence is increasingly a choice of lifestyle. 
Standing in contrast to open federalism is what Leo calls 'deep federalism' . 
While not typically included in academic analyses of federalism in Canada, deep 
federalism seeks to find national policies that reflect and, importantly, take into account 
local differences and necessities. Noting that Canadian federalism has always included 
asymmetry, Leo notes that many successful policy initiatives have occurred at the "nexus 
of negotiation and compromise unencumbered by the rigidity of constitutional 
provisions"56. Furthermore, he argues that there are examples where this logic has 
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continued into the development of national programs with local flavours - such as the 
Neighbourhood Improvement Programme, Winnipeg's Core Area Initiative, and the 
Vancouver Agreement addressing that city's downtown east side. These examples, and 
others, point to the existence for some time of national policies with local differences. In 
each case the problem was local, yet the implications of the problem challenged a 
national objective (liveable neighbourhoods and economically viable downtown areas). 
Thus, in response, national programs were developed that allowed for a significant degree 
of local input. In some cases most of the drive and expertise came from local authorities, 
who were better positioned to make assessments and decisions on the ground. 
As interpreted by Neil Bradford, deep federalism "[extends] the 
intergovernmental principle that one-size-policy-does-not-fit-all to include cities... 
[generating] a menu of federal programs to be bundled in accordance with local 
priorities"57. The process benefits not only the immediate areas addressed, but rather 
exposes all levels of government to alternative sets of expertise, connections, and points 
of view. Thus, deep federalism calls for national policies that must reflect local 
differences, and suggests that such an approach is not entirely foreign to Canadian 
federalism. While open federalism purports to encourage greater cooperation among 
governments, the central tenet of reducing the scope of the federal government makes it 
unclear whether future such problems could count on the support of the federal 
government in developing solutions and managing their implementation horizontally 
among governments. The ultimate conclusion to be drawn suggests that any change in the 
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federal processes in Canada that ignores broader social and economic trends stand little 
chance of solving any problems that arise as a result of these trends. 
The periods of Canadian federalism can be summarized by their demand stimulus, 
which order of government played the primary role in terms of initiative and political 
capital, which mechanisms governed the processes of intergovernmental relations, and 
which policy outcomes can be reasonably said to reflect the period. Table 3.1 attempts to 
summarize these criteria for each of the periods described above, and includes a 
somewhat hypothetical mention of'deep' federalism. Of note is the increasing 
prevalence of politics - not policy - as the demand stimulus. While any interpretation of 
the significance of any given demand stimulus is subjective, and my conclusion that any 
given period is driven by politics is difficult to empirically demonstrate, a careful 
comparison of the stages discussed appears to point to a lack of any evidence that open 
federalism is designed to accomplish any other goal than to placate restless premiers in an 
era of federal budget surpluses. Unlike, for example, cooperative federalism, where 
policy aims were clear (i.e. building the framework of the welfare state) and innovative 
adaptations were initiated in order to achieve them, there is no mention of policy goals in 
any of the justifications for open federalism. 
Indeed, the level of analysis upon which open federalism appears to be based 
harkens back to traditional, well-trodden territory. As Rocher and Nimijean point out, 
traditional analyses of Canadian federalism have been based on three considerations: the 
relationship between English and French Canada, Canada and the United States, and the 
38 
relationship between the central and provincial governments58. However, the forces of 
globalization and economic integration have changed the framework within which one 
must view Canadian federalism, and related to this is the re-emergence of the city-state as 
a fundamental building block of western societies. 
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IV) THE PLACE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM 
The delicate back and forth between Ottawa and the provinces that has 
characterized Canadian federalism is being replicated more recently between municipal 
governments and their provincial masters. The similarities are striking: there are 
demands for more authority, greater resources, and more stable and predictable 
intergovernmental arrangements. In many ways municipalities are armed with stronger, 
more legitimate grievances against the provinces than the provinces have typically had 
towards the federal government. As well, municipalities are in a position to take their 
concerns to both higher levels of government, which they have done and continue to do. 
In fact, much recent lobbying has been directed at the federal government and not the 
provinces. This may be in part a function of the fact that it is the federal government that 
is posting the largest fiscal surpluses and the municipalities are simply hedging their bets. 
It may also be a result of decades of provincial duplicity, ineffective tinkering, and a 
"culture of non-recognition and neglect"59 to municipal needs. 
Municipal-Provincial Relations 
In what has been described as a 'constitutional shrug'60, municipal governments 
were left out of the constitutional division of powers at the time of confederation. They 
are left, therefore, as creatures of the province without any formal constitutional standing 
and not recognized as an 'order' of government on par with the federal or provincial 
governments. Their powers are delegated by the province, and the fiscal levers available 
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to them are limited. This is, of course, a generalization, given that no one framework 
applies to all cities and their respective provinces, or even to all cities within a given 
province. In recognition of the differentiation among cities, the awkward yet useful 
'hyper-fractionalized quasi-subordinate' has been employed to summarize the patchwork, 
complex, and incongruous state of provincial-municipal relations61. 
Each province has a municipal act governing local governments, and a department 
is mandated to oversee the act. Often, the responsible ministry is combined with other 
departments, sometimes with no clear policy link (as is the case with the Department of 
Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services in British Columbia), or there are a 
number of departments with unclear distinction between roles (such as the existence of 
both a Ministry of Community and Social Services and of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
in Ontario). Although one might expect wide differences among provinces in their 
treatment of municipalities the spread is actually quite small from province to province in 
terms of municipal areas of authority, with a few notable exceptions. For example, 
municipalities in Ontario are the only ones that have been delegated responsibility for 
social services - the result of provincial re-organizing and a series of downloading efforts 
starting in 1995. Otherwise, there is a great deal of consistency in the areas of 
jurisdiction that have been assigned to municipal levels of government, including waste 
disposal, water and sewer, city planning, and transit. 
More complex, however, are the specific intergovernmental arrangements 
designed to deliver these services. In some, cost sharing mechanisms are in place, in 
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others municipalities are responsible for the entire costs of program delivery; in some 
cases joint decision-making structures, special purpose bodies, or consultative 
mechanisms are in place, in others they are absent. In all cases, such arrangements are 
determined by the province. 
This general consistency of areas of jurisdiction remains despite several efforts in 
all provinces to 'disentangle' the respective responsibilities of provinces and 
municipalities . Such efforts were initially driven by similar impulses across the 
country. These included the desire to step back from the increasing complexity of cost-
sharing programs that had been built up in the post-war period, as well as the complex 
intergovernmental relationships necessary to sustain such a system, and the growing 
attraction of the principle of subsidiarity. Most provinces set up commissions or panels 
to study how best to achieve a degree of disentanglement, and their approaches differed 
based on the specific situation in each province. Some provinces, such as Alberta and 
Manitoba, have approached disentanglement with legislation that grants municipalities 
greater authority in a broad range of areas, rather than within strictly confined 'local' 
areas of interest with significant provincial oversight. This approach is becoming more 
common, but is a recent phenomenon. British Columbia has granted Vancouver a greater 
range of powers and authority than other cities in the province in the late 1990s, and 
Ontario in 2005 passed the Stronger Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act to provide 
Toronto with some greater legislative authority and tax sources. 
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In general, however, it has been argued that efforts at disentanglement have been 
unsuccessful. The Ontario experiment, in particular, is often used to demonstrate the 
uselessness of such experiments, since the entire exercise ultimately did nothing to 
reduce the complexity of provincial-municipal relations. Under the Harris Conservatives 
in the mid 1990s, Ontario chose to pursue an approach of trade-offs, taking back some 
areas of jurisdiction while downloading others to the municipalities. The province took 
back control and funding for education, children's aid, and women's shelters, while 
assigning to municipal governments full responsibility for housing, transit and some 
community based public health. In addition, municipalities gained responsibility for 
sharing a portion of the funding for welfare, child care funding, and nursing homes. 
According to Graham et al and Garcea & Lesage, the province was attempting to retain 
those programs with fixed or declining expenditures, while downloading to 
municipalities those programs with increasing costs63. At times, neither funding nor 
funding mechanisms immediately accompanied these new program areas. In some cases 
the province stated its intention to maintain overall program development authority while 
expecting municipalities to bear the burden of program delivery. Such an approach fit 
with the Conservative Harris government's ideological approach to smaller government, 
but did not reflect a means-tested approach to alternative service delivery. Indeed, the 
Ontario approach to disentanglement flew in the face of several reports commissioned by 
the government, which generally argued for revenue-neutral exchanges, if they were 
required at all. 
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In some cases, functional reform proposals were accompanied by the 
amalgamation of municipalities. Toronto (1998) and Montreal (2002) have both 
experienced a degree of amalgamation, with varying degrees of success. Indeed, 
Montreal has recently gone through a process of de-amalgamation, reversing previous 
amalgamation efforts. Amalgamation was seen in most instances as a way to rationalize 
service delivery across urban municipal boundaries. In other cases, notably Ontario, 
amalgamation accompanied the radical reorganization of service delivery in the province 
under the 'Common Sense Revolution' of the Harris government, and expressly sought to 
further reduce expenditures by reducing the number of governing bodies and centralizing 
operations. These more recent efforts built on pervious urban reform movements in the 
1960s and 1970s, where large western centres such as Winnipeg, Calgary, and Edmonton 
expanded and amalgamated with outlying towns, effectively becoming 'uni-cities', where 
the vast bulk of both urban and sub-urban residents live within the city limits. 
Vancouver, notably, has avoided such geographic reform movements, and has instead 
maintained its two-tier structure, with the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) 
serving as the region-wide governing body, including representatives from twenty-two 
municipalities in the area. 
Many experts question the efficacy of such amalgamations - even apart from any 
other structural or functional reforms. Sancton, for example, points out that cost savings 
are rarely realized, and that regional arrangements may be just as effective in delivering 
services while maintaining a closer local connection to residents64. Others have noted 
that amalgamation helps cities, through sheer size, to become better advocates for greater 
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fiscal and policy responsibility. Moreover, at a 2002 symposium, several local officials 
representing recently amalgamated municipalities noted that in some cases, expenditure 
reductions have been achieved, and in the Toronto case, greater size had the appearance 
of placing Toronto more firmly on the 'world stage'65. In any case, structural reforms 
have been implemented by the province, which, as Sancton points out, reinforces their 
primacy in the municipal-provincial relationship66. 
Thus, the characterization of the relationship between municipalities and their 
provincial masters as 'quasi-subordinate hyper-factionalized' appears to be apt. 
Provincial governments, particularly in Ontario, have exerted their dominance by 
unilaterally changing boundaries, dictating the terms under which municipalities can 
operate, and seeking to 'sort out' responsibilities in ways that particularly benefit the 
provincial, not local, level of government. It is not surprising, then, that municipalities 
have historically looked to the federal government to provide overall direction and 
support, and continue to do so today. 
Municipal-federal relations 
The federal government, as per the Constitution, historically has not played a 
large role in urban affairs. However, this is not to suggest that the federal government 
has had no role to play concerning municipalities in Canada. It is important here to note 
the distinction between explicit federal intervention in municipal affairs, and implicit 
intervention67. Indeed, federal government areas of jurisdiction are often de facto areas of 
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urban or city interest, as is the case with immigration and housing . But the federal 
government may choose not to present or package such policies in terms of their 
municipal implications, or even view them through an 'urban lens'. Such implicit federal 
policies have been the norm, but the federal government has at times more explicitly 
articulated an urban policy agenda. 
The first urban venture for the federal government occurred in 1970, with the 
creation of the federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA). In part as a 
consequence of the prevailing attitude of nation building that had marked the previous 
decades69, and in part because urban problems were already at that time quite visible70, 
the federal government attempted to affect the nature of urban public policy in Canada 
through this new Ministry. Careful not to tread on provincial jurisdiction the MSUA had 
no program responsibilities, and was thus tasked only with coordination, relationship 
building, and integration of policies. The department was successful in coordinating 
several tri-lateral meetings among federal, provincial and municipal partners, but little 
concrete was achieved. Even this minimalist approach, however, angered many 
provincial governments, who saw the federal government as attempting to interfere in a 
sphere of provincial jurisdiction. Eventually the provinces refused to attend the meetings, 
and withdrew their support for MSUA generally. 
Without provincial support, and lacking any direct programs, the department was 
terminated in 1979, and the federal government retreated from an explicit role in urban 
issues for nearly 20 years. While most observers describe the MSUA experiment as 
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"fleeting", they also point out that little distinction was made at the time between 
"problems of 'the city and problems in the city"71. In other words, urbanization itself was 
the intended problem area, not the problems that occur in urban areas. Others take a 
different view, noting that whatever the distinctions in problem assignment might be, the 
MSUA was a 'courageous experiment' by the federal government72. 
It was not until the late 1990s that urban issues again captured some attention of 
federal leaders. At that time, urban issues were becoming even more prevalent, and calls 
for redress were becoming more vociferous following years of budgetary cutbacks from 
both the federal and provincial governments. As well, by the late 1990s the federal 
government had experienced some critical success with the $6B Canada Infrastructure 
Works Program, which the federal Liberals had introduced in 1994 based on requests 
from the FCM. The program was a 1/3 cost sharing program, where each level of 
government would be required to pay an equal portion of the projects' cost. An early 
review of the program noted that it had achieved a high degree of intergovernmental 
cooperation and successfully funded thousands of projects, with only a few instances of 
pork-barrel politics73. An additional $600 million was added to the program in the 1997 
budget. 
In 2000, the federal government rolled-up the Canada Infrastructure Works 
Program into the Infrastructure Canada Program, dedicating $2.65 billion over six years 
to assist in funding capital expenditures in municipalities through the Strategic 
Infrastructure Fund. In addition, two complementary funds (the Green Municipal 
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Investment Fund and the Green Municipal Enabling Fund, together worth $250 million) 
were created and placed with the FCM for management. Building on these programs, 
and reacting to greater pressure from the FCM and several big city mayors, not to 
mention urban members of the Liberal caucus, Prime Minister Chretien announced a 
Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues in 2001, and included some of the Task Force's 
recommendations in the 2002 Throne Speech, particularly in relation to investing in 
competitive and healthy cities. 
At the same time, Finance Minister Paul Martin was engaging the FCM to discuss 
their concerns and to indicate the federal government's willingness to expand its presence 
in municipal affairs. Indeed, Martin announced his intention to proceed with a 'new deal' 
for Canada's cities as early as 2002, while still the Minister of Finance74. Martin 
continued this theme throughout the Liberal leadership campaign in 2003, where the 
'New Deal for Canada's Cities' was a key platform feature, and sought to deliver on this 
promise once he became Prime Minister. In the 2004 and 2005 budgets, therefore, 
measures were included to transfer a portion of the gas tax collected by Ottawa, as well 
as a GST exemption for municipal purchases. Additionally, the federal government 
agreed to consult with municipalities during the preparation of the budget. However, at 
the time these initiatives were announced, they had been repackaged into a 'New Deal for 
Cities and Communities'. The addition of 'communities' to the package was likely a 
result of pressure from members of the rural caucus, who had already been successful in 
ensuring that their constituencies were not overlooked in the development of the $1B 
Municipal-Rural Infrastructure Fund (announced in 2003). 
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The New Deal signalled a realization at the federal level that municipalities were 
ill-equipped to deal with the plethora of issues confronting them without federal help. It 
also signalled an explicit urban policy from the federal government, although one that 
was poorly defined and broad in scope. No new federal department accompanied the 
New Deal (which in any case became somewhat watered down with the addition of 
'communities', effectively making the program so broad as to be nearly useless in 
addressing the compounded problem of large cities), although a Cities Secretariat was 
created at the Privy Council Office and eventually moved to a new Portfolio of Transport, 
Infrastructure and Communities. While not a department on its own, the addition of a 
'communities' link to Transport Canada marks the first federal incursion into urban 
affairs since the MSUA. 
The latest rounds of federal involvement in urban affairs were precipitated to a 
large extent by the active involvement of the FCM. The FCM is Canada's foremost 
advocacy group for municipal issues, and comprises municipal officials from across 
Canada, as well as provincial municipal associations. The FCM was involved in the 
discussions that led up to the first federal experiment in urban affairs in 1970, but had not 
yet developed a common position or solutions75. At that time, the FCMs insistence on 
being included in constitutional negotiations of the late 1970s and early 1980s as a third 
level of government was met with resistance by the provinces, and therefore ultimately 
relegated the FCM to the sidelines. However, the FCM was instrumental in lobbying for 
more infrastructure funding from the federal government throughout the 1980s and early 
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1990s, eventually influencing the inclusion of infrastructure funding in the Liberal 
Party's 1993 campaign platform. 
Yet it was not until the real effects of downloading and budget cuts were felt that 
the FCM was able to lobby with renewed urgency. In 1991, the Conservative 
government of Brian Mulroney capped transfers under the Established Program 
Financing provisions to the provinces, most of which similarly transferred less funding to 
their municipalities. These financial restrictions were exacerbated by the Chretien/Martin 
budget of 1995, which altered the funding mechanisms between the federal and 
provincial governments, and drastically reduced the overall level of payments. Again, in 
most cases, provinces passed these cuts on to municipal governments. It is in this context 
that the FCM once again began to advocate for larger changes to the structure of 
Canadian federalism, particularly with respect to municipal financing. A measure of their 
success can be seen in the New Deal itself, in addition to the fact that the FCM has been 
tasked with management responsibilities of the Green Municipal Fund provided by the 
federal government. 
Since the election of the Harper Conservatives in 2005, the fate of the New Deal 
has been in question. As noted in the previous chapter, the Conservative government has 
articulated a vision of federalism that relies on strong provinces, particularly with respect 
to their constitutional authority over municipal affairs. A broad funding scheme that 
involves the federal government in municipal funding would appear, therefore, to be 
contrary to the Conservative platform. However, Prime Minister Harper has not 
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dismantled the Infrastructure and Communities Branch of Transport Canada, nor has he 
withdrawn the provisions of the New Deal gas tax transfer. The 2006 federal budget 
continued these programs, adding $2B to the Strategic Infrastructure Fund and $2.2B to 
the Municipal-Rural Infrastructure Fund (the weight given to the Municipal-Rural fund 
reflects, no doubt, the Conservative Party's link to rural areas of the country). In 2007 
the Build Canada Plan was announced, touting $33B in federal funding for infrastructure. 
Much of the funding, however, is comprised of existing monies made available through 
the New Deal, and given the lack of specificity and focus it is unclear how much funding 
will actually make its way into urban areas. 
What is clear is that the thrust of open federalism has meant that the Conservative 
government has "substantially scaled back the federal urban agenda" . More pointedly, 
the Toronto Star recently summarized Harper's approach with the headline "PM to cities: 
Drop Dead"77. Rather than pursue the New Deal with vigour, or add to it in any way, the 
Conservative government has opted instead to direct the thrust of its urban agenda to 
rectifying the fiscal imbalance with the provinces. As the FCM notes, by focussing its 
priority in this way, the federal government has defined its role in Canada's urban areas 
very narrowly . Thus, while the core elements of the New Deal remain, it has been 
characterized as a program in transition, with the goals and intent of the program largely 
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truncated and the overall policy direction in limbo . 
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Fiscal federalism 
It is within this context of intergovernmental relations that municipalities are 
confronted with their greatest challenge: responding to their increasing responsibilities 
within the present fiscal framework. Indeed, no discussion of the federal structure in 
Canada is complete without serious reference to the revenue-generating capacity of each 
level of government and their corresponding expenditures. While federal/provincial 
squabbles over the so-called 'fiscal imbalance' have become commonplace in Canadian 
political discourse, there is much evidence to suggest that in reality, it is municipalities 
that are critically under funded and who have a more legitimate basis to advocate for 
more fiscal autonomy . As one author puts it, "Canadian cites are among the most 
fiscally restrained in the world" . As another argues, it is the dire fiscal situation 
confronting municipalities that is responsible for putting urban affairs back on the public 
policy agenda . 
As creatures of the province, municipal tax levers and spending responsibilities 
are strictly controlled. Local authorities must, by provincial law, balance their budgets 
and negotiate with the province to borrow for any capital expenditures. In addition, most 
municipalities are limited to property tax as a source of revenue, although provincial and 
federal grants, as well as occasionally other tax levers, are minimally available. As 
Tables 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 illustrate, on average, municipalities raise over 52% of their 
revenues from property taxes, while grants account for just 17% of revenues. The 
proportion of grants has been declining and varies widely, from 24.9% (largely in the 
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form of conditional grants) of Toronto's budget to 2% of Vancouver's. User fees make 
up an additional 23% of revenues83. This heavy reliance on property taxes, combined 
with legislated balanced budgets, leaves municipal governments with little room to 
manoeuvre. Balancing budget expenditures may require municipalities to reduce service 
delivery, or to raise taxes and potentially chase away residents or business. Others point 
out that property taxes are among the least effective and flexible - they are highly visible, 
do not reflect economic performance, tend to favour unsustainable land-use patterns 
(single family dwellings), and make no differentiation based on ability to pay84. 
The increasing calls for greater municipal access to sources of revenue have been 
slowly taken up by provincial governments in Canada. Vancouver, for example, has 
recently been granted the authority to tax hotel room stays, where 4% of the cost of the 
stay is returned to the city to be spent on tourism. Since 2005 the province transfers the 
city's share of all traffic fine revenues back to the city. Even so, BC's funding support 
for Vancouver remains lower today than it had been in 1996. In fact, between 1996 and 
1997 provincial support decreased from $20.5M to $5.8M85. Ontario's recent The 
Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act (2006) grants Toronto a wider, 
although still limited, array of tax options. Other funding arrangements also exist, such as 
Quebec's vehicle licensing sharing scheme for Montreal. The federal government has 
also recently expanded its role with respect to urban financing, as noted, through the New 
Deal/Build Canada provisions and other infrastructure financing funds. Previous federal 
involvement was usually predicated on project specific goals (Winnipeg's 'Forks') or 
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mega-projects (such as the Olympic Games or World Expositions), and required 
provincial consultation and approval. 
Such fiscal structures do not make a compelling case for reform on their own. 
Certainly flexibility and accountability are desirable, but nothing in the structure itself 
indicates that it is not otherwise working. It is only when these limitations on municipal 
financing are stacked up against the types of demands placed on cities in Canada that the 
picture becomes complete. Not only have municipal governments generally been most 
negatively affected by senior level government downloading throughout the 1990s, they 
are also confronted with a broad array of challenges that are unique to Canada's large 
urban centres. Canada's largest cities continue to attract a disproportionate number of 
immigrants , are homes to our centres of innovation and industry, and bear the brunt of 
environmental degradation, homelessness and poverty . The scale of infrastructure 
requirements in large centres cannot be compared to smaller centres or rural areas. 
The combined effect of downloading on the one hand, and increasing pressures on 
the other, has prompted municipalities to renew their efforts to seek changes to the 
structure of fiscal federalism in Canada. The FCM has often led the way, conducting 
comparative studies and presenting options to Parliamentary committees (including the 
caucus Task Force). The Big City Mayors Caucus of the FCM has similarly advanced 
positions outlining financial constraints as the key issue88. At times, individual mayors 
have taken the initiative to press for greater funding. Former Winnipeg Mayor Glen 
Murray was an outspoken advocate for greater municipal authority, and Toronto mayor 
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David Miller took the initiative in 2007 to call for a portion of the GST to be allocated to 
cities with the "One Cent Now!" challenge. Despite these activities, municipalities 
remain fiscally restrained. They remain under the control of provincial governments with 
little recourse to policy innovation, and are increasingly unable to meet the demands for 
current infrastructure improvements, let alone new or forward-thinking infrastructure. 
Underlying these demands is a rich literature on fiscal federalism that generally 
focuses on cost benefits and economic efficiencies89. In this literature, authors tend to 
restrict their analysis to questions of the 'optimal' vertical and horizontal fiscal gap 
between levels of government. But, as Lazar points out, such analyses are often 
incomplete in that they overlook the non-economic goals of fiscal federalism90. In 
Canada, for example, the period of cooperative federalism outlined in Chapter II was 
only partly driven by considerations of economic efficiency. Equally as important was 
the desire to foster a sense of pan-Canadianism through the construction of national 
programs. This goal is what Lazar refers to as the 'quasi constitutional' impacts of fiscal 
federalism, which are more difficult to measure but no less important than simple models 
of economic efficiency within the federation. Thus, what drives the debate on municipal 
fiscal imbalance should not only be viewed in light of what might serve economic 
efficiencies, but also by the potential impact on the overall national interest. 
The question now is whether the proposed intergovernmental arrangements of 
open federalism will respond to these demands: calls from municipalities for increasing 
authority and fiscal resources to meet growing areas of responsibility. Using the two 
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specific issues of housing and transportation it is possible to illustrate where the needs 
are, and what sort of responses one might expect under open federalism. 
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V) THE CASES OF PUBLIC HOUSING AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
The preceding chapters have outlined the evolution of federalism in Canada and 
the place of municipalities within this federal context. Where these two strands meet is in 
the cities themselves. The federal structure and processes of Canada and the place of 
municipalities within this framework are most clearly evident when simply assessing the 
state Canada's urban centres. While the focus of this chapter will be on public housing 
and public transportation, it is first necessary to assess the overall state of affairs in 
Canada's cities. 
In the urban context, infrastructure is an imprecise word, covering everything 
from sewer and water systems, roads and community centres, sidewalks, parks and public 
transit, etc. While it is difficult to determine the precise cost of repairing and updating 
municipal infrastructure across the country, the Conference Board estimates the figure at 
$120 billion91. Another estimate by the TD Bank shows that there is a $2B 
'infrastructure gap' in ongoing maintenance and upgrade funding each year92. Already in 
1983 the FCM estimated the cost for infrastructure repairs to be $12 billion93, and in 
November 2007 the FCM found an estimate similar to the Conference Board's, arguing 
that the cost for infrastructure upgrades is now $123 billion94. In part, such high figures 
are due to the fact that much of Canada's municipal infrastructure is due for renewal or 
replacement. As well, they have generally been neglected, or simply been maintained to 
a level of basic functionality, for decades. Infrastructure costs are also high because 
cities have been driven to build property tax bases further away from their central cores. 
58 
The utilities and transportations connections between urban and sprawling suburban areas 
are thus extensive. 
Of course, such assessments of infrastructure are generalizations, since there is no 
uniform state of infrastructure in Canada. In the older centres of Montreal and Toronto, 
infrastructure is naturally older and more extensive and therefore in need of repair. By 
contrast, Vancouver is not generally confronted with the problems of ageing but rather 
with the need for rapidly expanding infrastructure. In short, there is a wide 
differentiation from place to place, but taken together the infrastructure gap in Canada 
remains significant. Given the sheer size and cost of infrastructure renewal in Canada's 
municipalities, there appears to be an obvious role for higher levels of government, with 
the most common argument calling for the comparably large spending power of the 
federal government95. 
Housing and transportation have been identified as issues for analysis not only 
because they are predominantly urban in nature, but also because there is a growing trend 
to link performance on such policy issues to broader policy outcomes such as quality of 
life and economic competitiveness. In fact, such links between urban infrastructure, 
transit, environment, and housing, on the one hand, and overall quality of life and global 
economic competitiveness on the other are commonly made in most reports and 
observations on the issue96. Some organizations have quantified these links in terms of 
overall quality of life. For example, Mercer Consulting and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit have ranked cities worldwide based on a number of specific criteria which include 
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housing and transportation . Often, such assessments include comparisons based on 
ratios of income to average house prices, or percentage of time required to commute, on 
average, from home to work. While Canadian cities typically fare well in these rankings, 
it is largely due to other factors that receive higher survey weight, such as political 
stability and low crime rates. 
1) Housing 
Notwithstanding links between housing and urban competitiveness, as Tom Kent 
notes, affordable housing in Canada is the "greatest of urban deficiencies"98. Moreover, 
he argues that without some attention to the housing issue in our urban centres the 
advantages of civic (read: urban) life are diminishing. At present, roughly 6% of 
Canadian households live in non-market social housing (compared to nearly 40% for the 
Netherlands, for example). Significantly, Canada is the only developed country in the 
world without a national housing policy. The result is that "Canada has the most private-
sector-dominated, market based housing system of any Western nation"99. 
That housing is an urban concern is not in doubt: as Moore and Skaburskis 
demonstrate, housing needs based on the percentage of income spent on housing (using a 
30% and 50% threshold) are far greater in Canada's urban areas than in rural areas100. 
They also show that the rate of those in dire need of affordable housing rose by a greater 
rate between 1991 and 1996 in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. Moreover, housing 
needs were demonstrably higher in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, where 
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Canada's largest cities are located, than in the Maritimes or the Prairies. Similarly, TD 
Economics reported in 2003 that Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal were the first, 
second and third place locations with the highest rates of housing affordability problems 
in2000101. 
Housing, like infrastructure, is an imprecise term. In its broadest sense, housing 
refers to the entire stock of housing units, whether owned or rented, market or non-
market. For the purposes of this paper, however, housing refers to housing that is 
publicly owned or supported, as well as 'affordable housing', which includes housing that 
is subject to rent controls, rent supplements, or other regulations that protect the tenant 
from market fluctuations. Also, housing as a policy issue consists of two different 
strands. First, affordable housing is an issue for many people who actually have 
accommodation, but spend more than 30% (the traditional figure used by government and 
not-for-profit agencies in determining housing needs) of their income on shelter and are 
at risk of becoming homeless. Second, housing is also obviously an issue for those who 
do not have shelter at all, the already homeless. These two categories are increasingly 
linked, as rental costs continue to grow at higher rates than wages generally, and those 
who are housed but at risk of homelessness become priced out of the housing market. 
In terms of the provision of affordable, low income, or other social housing, as 
Hulchanski points out, all levels of government bear some responsibility102. But he 
further notes that despite jurisdictional responsibilities, it is the federal and municipal 
levels of government that have played the most important roles with respect to housing 
61 
policy and implementation. Provincial activity in housing has been 'an exception'. 
Others have noted the same, but emphasized that the federal government has made 
several advances into housing policy, often providing leadership and facilitating 
provincial and municipal action103. 
1.1) The federal role: 
The federal government has had a large role to play in the provision of public 
housing, as well as in assisting homeowners. The federal government first entered the 
housing policy field through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
which was created in 1946. While the CMHC had been instrumental in the post-war 
period for providing mortgage insurance and assisting in the boom in home ownership 
(particularly in suburbs, which then later became a problem), it did not actively pursue 
non-market social housing until 1964. At that time, amendments to the National Housing 
Act provided for a municipally run housing program, fully funded by the federal 
government. Similar to the MSUA experiment, which came on the heels of a period of 
intense nation building by Ottawa, the National Housing Act was a way for the federal 
government to by-pass the provinces and establish a federal presence in pursuit of a 
national housing policy - ostensibly in the name of national interest. Following 
recommendations from a federal Task Force in 1969, the federal government increased 
its spending on social housing, such that between 1969 and 1980, 70% of all houses 
purchased were insured federally, and 28% of all new construction proceeded with a 
government subsidy104. Non-market social housing and co-operative housing programs 
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were also introduced in this time since, as the federal minister for urban affairs noted in 
1973, housing was seen to be an issue of national importance105. 
The 1950s through the mid 1970s was a period of extensive intergovernmental 
coordination in the delivery of housing services, as well as of increasing pressures on the 
housing market as baby-boomers sought to purchase homes similar to the detached 
homes they had grown up in. Some provinces also jumped in to offer similar subsidy and 
insurance programs as the federal government, generally elbowing their way into 
increased jurisdiction over the issue. As Carroll notes, since housing needs were not 
uniform across the country, provinces felt best positioned to deliver on their housing 
needs. Competing provincial and federal subsidies, combined with unfavourable market 
conditions, led to an eventual glut of federally constructed housing, and forced the federal 
government to redefine its role in housing policy in the late 1970s. The federal 
government then abandoned its broader programs dealing with neighbourhood 
improvement and introduced a block municipal grant in 1978. 
These events, combined with effective private sector lobbying, convinced the 
Mulroney Conservative government in 1984 that non-market housing was unfair, and 
thus began a period of decreasing funding for housing106. In 1986 the federal government 
signed agreements with provincial governments to turn over authority for the remaining 
federal housing programs (including residential rehabilitation, non-profit and co-
operative housing, as well as aboriginal housing policies) to the provinces. By 1993, 
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federal funding for new housing had been entirely eliminated (remaining funding was for 
existing housing stock). 
In 1993, the newly elected Liberal government was faced with a number of 
economic and political considerations that made re-entry into the housing market a 
difficult issue But, with the elimination of the federal deficit in 1997 and the negotiation 
of the SUFA in 1998, the federal government sought to return to an active role. Federal 
efforts were met, however, with provincial resistance. For example, when the federal 
government announced in 2001 the Federal-Provincial Affordable Housing Framework, 
which would have reached $1B in federal funding by 2007-08, the provinces resented the 
requirement to provide provincial matching funds for any programs or initiatives.107 
Provincial reluctance to participate in the federal housing initiative was so great that the 
federal government threatened to extend funding directly to municipalities and housing 
providers as a way to by-pass the provinces.108 
In summary, the role of the federal government in public housing can be 
characterized as historically significant but, more recently, unpredictable. While its 
traditional role has been to provide assistance to homeowners, this narrow focus began to 
expand to cover public housing in the 1960s and 1970s. More recent decades have been 
marked by retrenchment and renewal. However, the federal government's renewed 
interest in public housing in the early 2000s did not go so far as to articulate a national 
housing policy. Such a goal has long been the desire of a range of housing and 
homelessness advocates, who were given institutional backup in November 2007 by a 
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UN Special Rapporteur who recommended unequivocally that Canada develop and 
implement a national housing strategy109. The approach proposed by open federalism 
stands to leave Canada as the only developed nation in the world without one, and leave 
municipalities to the changing priorities of their provincial masters. 
1.2) Toronto / Ontario 
Ontario has a long history of involvement in affordable housing programs, 
including rent controls, provincially mandated restrictions on demolitions and 
conversions, and the creation of rental standards. The bulk of administration of housing 
programs, however, falls to municipalities. In most cases an agency is tasked with 
administering municipal housing programs. In Toronto, the Toronto Community 
Housing Agency manages the majority of the city's social housing, owning a total of 
58,194 units (in 2005). The Agency is managed by a board appointed by the City 
Council and reports directly to the Council. In addition to owning and managing the 
largest proportion of social housing units in the city, the agency also manages a variety of 
rent supplement programs on behalf of the city. A range of other providers are also key 
players, including not-for-profit housing organizations (20,907 units), co-operatives 
(7,045 units), and private sector housing groups (3,260 units). 
The city's involvement in social housing has grown since the mid 1990s. The 
federal government's retreat from social housing in 1993 was seen by some provinces as 
an opportunity to become further engaged in the housing issue. In Ontario, however, the 
Harris Conservative government chose in 1995 to use the opportunity to pursue market 
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oriented principles and effectively get the government out of housing. Ontario cancelled 
all funding for existing or future projects, transferred authority over social housing to 
municipalities, and simultaneously made it easier for private sector developers to enter 
the social-housing market. In total, the provincial government backed out of or cancelled 
17,000 planned units, as well as over 3,000 rent controlled and 3,300 subsidised units. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the effect of this withdrawal. Furthermore, in 2000, the provincial 
government passed the Social Housing Reform Act, transferring responsibility for social 
housing to municipalities. By 2001, through a two-stage process, all of the provincially 
owned social housing stock, as well as the responsibility for managing it, were 
transferred to the City of Toronto. Therefore, the City of Toronto is now responsible for 
44% of the funding for social housing, while the province accounts for only 4%. A 
significant amount (34%) is received from the federal government, largely for the 
maintenance of units already owned federally through the CMHC. Toronto has been 
forced to turn to private sector housing providers to make up the funding slack. When 
federal funds were made available again in 2001, based on matching criteria, Ontario 
refused to accept the funding, preferring to leave it untouched. 
As a result, waiting lists have grown and homelessness continues to be a problem 
(see Figure 5.2). Social housing waiting lists are over 71,000 in Toronto alone (over 
122,426 for Ontario as a whole) and the average wait time is almost 8.5 years110. As 
Toba Bryant argues, the effect of the Ontario government's downloading and private-
sector dominated approach to housing has been that homelessness and housing problems 
have 'exploded', and that the entire premise of the Harris government's approach was 
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'pathetically false'111. Moreover, as Hackworth and Moriah note, the reforms in Ontario 
between 1995 and 2001 were more ideologically based than means-tested112. The 
Conservative government was pursuing neo-liberal policies across the board (including 
its efforts to disentangle from municipal governments) and government-subsidized social 
housing was ripe for privatization. In effect, the Harris government was revisiting similar 
efforts by the federal Conservatives under Mulroney. 
The election of the McGuinty Liberals in 2003 brought some change to housing 
policy. The provincial government, for example, took up the federal government's offer 
for cost-shared programs. But, while the 2005 Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing 
Program has added $380M to the construction of new subsidised and social housing, 
critics maintain that the program is too little, too late. Also, the Homelessness Action 
Group in Toronto argues that some funds have not gone to the program's stated goals. 
They suggest that the province's 2007 budget allocated 60% of the federal funding to rent 
subsidies for existing housing stock, not new housing initiatives as intended113. 
The Toronto experience in housing represents a clear illustration of the effects of 
the federal and provincial downloading exercises of the mid 1990s. The experience has 
been marked by policy schizophrenia, an exacerbated housing problem, and new 
pressures on the city. While steps have been taken recently to provide better solutions, 
there appears to be a limited willingness from the federal government to re-engage in the 
housing field. Indeed, open federalism appears to rely on a strong provincial response 
when the evidence here suggests that such a response is far from guaranteed. 
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1.3) Vancouver - British Columbia 
British Columbia has a somewhat better record of delivering on social housing 
than Ontario. The province has demonstrated a greater willingness to maintain an active 
presence in the housing field. In fact, while Toronto has been assigned responsibility for 
housing, in Vancouver the province is the main provider and policy maker. Nevertheless, 
the province has only recently announced a comprehensive strategy and increased 
funding to deal with the continually increasing levels of homelessness and prohibitive 
housing prices. 
Following the federal retrenchment from the social housing field, British 
Columbia continued to increase funding to social housing. In fact, total funding went 
from S44.5M in 1992 to $139M in 2004114. Much of this funding was administered by 
BC Housing, the provincial agency with responsibility both for social housing and rent 
supplement programs. While the City of Vancouver and the Greater Vancouver Regional 
District (GVRD) play key roles in the support of housing programs, their involvement is 
less than in Toronto since the provincial government has not undertaken a downloading 
exercise similar to Ontario's. The City has been a leader, however, in using the tools at 
its disposal to affect the development of social housing. For example, the council has 
implemented a requirement that 20% of all new large residential development be 
allocated to affordable housing. The Greater Vancouver Housing Corporation manages a 
proportion of the city's social housing stock, and a variety of not-for-profit and private 
68 
sector players are also involved. The GVRD, for its part, has developed a regional 
homelessness plan to coordinate region wide efforts. 
It is the province, however, that plays the lead role in housing policy and funding. 
In 2006, the provincial government spent over $200M on shelter and housing initiatives, 
and announced that 3,500 new units were under construction. In 2007, under a Provincial 
Housing Strategy, the Campbell Liberals announced $2B in new spending over four 
years, as well as a housing endowment fund for 'innovative' housing projects. 
While these developments are signs of active provincial involvement, it must be 
remembered that the strategy is not specific to Vancouver, and the overall plan for 
delivering housing remains directed by the province, not Vancouver or the GVRD. Also, 
there is some evidence to suggest that the provincial government has taken a broad view 
of its contributions to housing. John Irwin finds evidence that new funding offered by the 
federal government was actually diverted by the province into the health care system115. 
Rather than being used for construction of new units or the improvement of existing 
units, the province decided to use the funding to support existing 'assisted-living' units 
for senior citizens. There are merits, of course, in supporting the elderly, but such units, 
he argues, are more rightly seen as a component of the health care system, not the 
housing system. 
In addition, even when sustained funding has been made available, the rate of 
homelessness in Vancouver has risen. The 2005 Homeless Count revealed that between 
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2002 and 2005 there was a 238% increase in 'street homeless' in Vancouver, with an 
additional 33% increase in the number of homeless in shelters or social housing116. Also 
of note, Vancouver is home to one of the country's most notoriously under-privileged 
urban areas: the Downtown Eastside. The most recent and comprehensive plan to deal 
with the housing and other problems in this area is a tri-level (federal-provincial-
municipal) initiative, the very kind open federalism appears to reject. 
Thus, while Vancouver has not experienced the same degree of policy 
polarization and reversals as Ontario, it remains susceptible to housing pressures and 
increasing levels of homelessness. As a result, the GVRD noted in 2007 that any local or 
regional housing strategy is ultimately dependant on the provincial and federal 
governments committing to partnerships with the City of Vancouver and the GVRD117. 
1.4) Montreal - Quebec: 
The Montreal experience is somewhat akin to Vancouver's, in that the provincial 
government, too, has largely avoided the policy schizophrenia of Ontario with respect to 
housing. In fact, Quebec was among the first provinces to sign housing agreements with 
the federal government when funding was re-established in 2001. Interestingly, CMHC 
partnerships feature prominently in the intergovernmental arrangements to deliver 
housing in Quebec and Montreal. A total of 8% of Quebec households received some 
sort of rental assistance in 1999, up from 3% in 1981U8. 
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Two provincial government programs largely cover the social housing 
component: AccesLogic and Affordable Housing Quebec. Both provincial programs 
grant financial assistance to housing co-operatives, non-profit organizations and 
municipal housing authorities in support of affordable housing initiatives. While 
generally managed provincially, agreements have been signed between the provincial 
government and the City of Montreal to allow it to manage AccesLogic and Affordable 
Housing Quebec within its jurisdiction. Municipally, the city has mandated the Societe 
d'habitation et de developpement de Montreal and the Societe de developpement de 
Montreal (combined under one umbrella in 2007) to work with the province in delivering 
on these programs. 
It is through such partnerships that the city developed the Operation Solidarite 
5,000 initiative, launched in 2002. Under the initiative, the city of Montreal aimed to 
create 5,000 affordable housing units by 2007. The city provided 15% of the funding and 
30% of the building lots, with both provincial programs and CMHC contributing to the 
remaining funding (estimated at $300M combined). The program encouraged proposals 
from not-for-profit and co-operative housing organizations, as well as the Office 
municipal d'habitation de Montreal. The program was so successful that the city has now 
reported that Solidarite 5,000 has been expanded to become Operation Solidarite 15,000, 
with a goal of creating 15,000 new affordable housing units by 2009119. 
While these successes and remarkable absence of federal-provincial-municipal 
confrontation appear to paint a picture of an effective status quo, it is important to note 
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that Montreal's initiatives are heavily dependent on higher levels of government. The 
city has been successful at using such devices as land-use zoning and well established 
inter-agency relationships to advance several initiatives, but without federal and 
provincial funding such initiatives would be severely curtailed. The first 
recommendation of the city's most recent housing plan is to secure guarantees from the 
province for continued funding, and the second recommends that the city continue to 
lobby the federal government for funding increases120. Also, Montreal's generally lower 
housing and rental prices are at the greatest risk of rising faster than elsewhere, where 
prices and rents are already high. Such an increase would pose problems for an economy 
already more depressed than in Toronto and Vancouver. Finally, it is not insignificant, as 
Bunting, Walks and Filion argue, that the number of 'housing stressed' households in 
Montreal remains greater than the entire household population of Saskatoon121. 
1.5 Housing Summary and Assessment 
While provincial governments in British Columbia and Quebec have shown a 
sustained commitment to public housing initiatives, the same cannot be said for Ontario 
and the federal government. In the latter two cases, housing policy has been marked by 
unpredictability and instability. The retrenchment had a double effect in Toronto, which 
was forced to bear the brunt of policy reversals at both higher levels of government. 
Montreal and Vancouver have fared better, and successive provincial governments there 
have attempted to compensate for the loss of federal interest and investment. Yet neither 
has escaped the housing crisis. Both Montreal and Vancouver, like Toronto, have large 
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homeless populations, and housing affordability pressures continue to put more residents 
at risk of homelessness. 
Moreover, there is little policy cohesion in the approach to public housing across 
jurisdictions. Toronto is far more private sector dominated than elsewhere, and largely 
responsible for public housing on its own. Montreal has seen some success in 
provincial/municipal partnerships, while in Vancouver the province has staked out the 
largest policy and program delivery role. Such policy differences are laudable on the one 
hand, demonstrating the ability of governments to experiment and tailor programs and 
services to their specific needs. On the other hand, this experimentation has not yielded 
significant results, in that housing remains a pressing and growing issue. 
There have been some proposals for federal intervention in the housing policy 
field that attempt to reconcile these two features. Among others, the FCM has advocated 
for a national housing strategy that remains sensitive to local needs122. In their view, any 
housing strategy must meet a number of policy goals, including: meeting long term rental 
demand; meeting needs in growing communities; ensuring that new rental supply is 
suitable and affordable; providing housing for special needs; reinvesting in disadvantaged 
communities; and, renovating and adapting existing buildings. Such criteria form a 
useful baseline by which to measure the current open federalism approach. 
How is open federalism likely to meet policy goals such as these? The short 
answer is that it is designed precisely not to meet these objectives, since they are largely 
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in provincial jurisdiction. In the same way that the federal Conservatives do not see the 
federal government as 'in the pothole business', it would equally see itself as not 'in the 
renovation business'. Beyond such platitudes, however, lies an ideological thrust and 
policy decision: the federal Conservatives have taken the approach to housing that puts 
the emphasis on home ownership. Their 2005 platform makes this emphasis clear, and 
while it includes references to addressing homelessness, the thrust is on tax relief and tax 
incentives . As outlined in table 5.7, such an approach not only fails to deliver a 
national housing strategy, it can only marginally address the discrete policy goals 
contained within such a strategy as outlined by the FCM. For example, while using tax 
breaks and incentives may reduce the burden of housing affordability and induce some 
private-sector development, the Ontario experience suggests that such expectations may 
be misplaced. Similarly, the Vancouver experience demonstrates that consistent 
municipal insistence on public housing quotas on new developments can increase overall 
stock, but without sustained federal and provincial support overall housing affordability 
remains problematic and homelessness continues to grow. Open federalism does not 
appear to offer solutions to such problems, and its insistence on jurisdictional clarity 
ignores the need to address overlapping policy goals in the area of public housing. 
2) Transportation 
There is perhaps an even greater, more explicit link between economic 
competitiveness and public transportation than is the case with public housing. As the 
Societe de Transport de Montreal points out, traffic congestion can lead to billions in lost 
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revenues due to delivery delays124. The Canadian Urban Transit Association (CUTA) 
similarly reports that not only can public transportation positively impact the economy by 
reducing congestion, it also stands to increase property values, influence the location of 
business within the city, reduce energy consumption, reduce transportation times (saving 
costs associated to long commutes but also allowing workers to be more productive while 
commuting), and produce transit-related employment125. Thus, transportation not only 
encompasses a wide range of issues, it can also be addressed from many angles. Initial 
treatments of transportation focussed on the efficient movement of goods and people 
from an economic perspective126. While these concerns still exist and are no less 
important, additional environmental concerns have added salience to the transportation 
issue, particularly in terms of public transit and alternatives to automobile use. Such 
concerns spill over into urban and regional planning discussions, as well as discussions 
on neighbourhood development and land use. 
Moreover, while housing is a quality of life issue for those who are homeless or at 
risk of becoming homeless (and there are spill-over affects for select areas of the city), 
transportation is increasingly recognized as a quality of life issue for the vast majority of 
Canadians because of the link to environmental degradation. Urban transportation is 
such a multi-faceted issue that the Conference Board of Canada has claimed: "when it 
comes to advancing the economic, social, and environmental sustainability of our cities, 
the highest connective infrastructure priority is urban transportation"127. In many ways, 
public transportation is becoming recognized as a solution to a variety of problems, both 
economic and environmental. While the scope of such problems is in no way limited to 
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urban centres, it is only in larger cities where mass-transit solutions stand to have any real 
impact. It is also the case that Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver operate the largest 
transportation systems in Canada, and together represent the bulk of the Canadian 
economy. 
It is off en difficult to isolate the state of public transportation from the larger issue 
of infrastructure. Public transportation is linked to an entire system of transportation that 
includes roads, highways, airports, marine ports and the like. But, it is estimated that a 
huge proportion of infrastructure costs is tied up in transportation - both public and 
private. TD Economics estimates that of the total infrastructure gap, however it is 
calculated, transit and transportation accounts for fully 60%128. In addition, the 
Canadian Urban Transit Association estimated in 2004 that the infrastructure 
requirements of Canada's transit systems was $21 billion for the four year period from 
2006-2010129. 
Despite its importance, transportation in Canada's cities has generally been left to 
municipalities to fund. This is particularly true with respect to public transit. According 
to 2001 statistics, transportation accounts for almost 20% of municipal spending, but it is 
argued that such expenditures are insufficient130. In addition, such spending may not 
include other, less apparent, transportation infrastructure such as bike lanes, walking 
paths, and the like. Canadian public transit operations rely predominantly on passenger 
fares for revenues, with municipal and provincial revenues accounting for the rest (see 
Figures 5.3 - 5.6). There is no direct federal subsidy for public transit operations in 
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Canada - the only G8 nation without such a subsidy - and there is no federal long-term 
public transportation funding. 
2.1) The Federal Role: 
Unlike housing, the federal government has not, historically, played a large role in 
the financing or development of urban transportation systems. It has tended to focus, as 
per the Constitution, on transportation areas within its jurisdiction, such as ports, 
waterways, and rail infrastructure. But, the federal government has not been entirely 
absent from urban transit issues. It has been a one-time capital funding partner, for 
example, in the construction and expansion of rapid transit lines in Toronto, Montreal and 
Vancouver — often in conjunction with federal spending for the hosting of mega-events 
such as the World's Fair or the Olympics. More recently, in 2005 the federal Liberal 
government announced the Public Transit Fund and the Public Transit Capital Fund, 
worth $1.3 billion, to assist provinces and municipalities to maintain or expand their 
existing public transit systems. These funds were in addition to any transit funding 
secured through the New Deal gas tax transfer, the Green Municipal Fund, or other 
infrastructure programs. In addition, Transport Canada operates several programs 
designed to share best practices and research on public transit solutions, such as the 
Urban Transit Showcase Program. 
The current Conservative government has continued these programs, and in fact 
announced in March 2007 that it would provide $960 million in funding to Toronto for 
rapid transit (Ontario had already set aside $670 for the project, under cost-sharing 
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provisions). In October of 2007, the federal government announced the Building Canada 
Plan, bundling $33B in federal funding to be directed at infrastructure. The Plan, 
however, includes only limited reference to public transit. Public transit is listed under a 
range of target programs under the program goal of building a cleaner environment, one 
of three overarching program goals. Finally, the federal Conservatives also introduced a 
tax credit for transit users, representing an indirect investment in transit of about $150 
million annually. 
However, as with infrastructure generally, such funding is welcome but 
insufficient. For the sake of comparison, it should be noted that the U.S. federal 
government has allocated $453 billion over the last 10 years to urban public transit 
initiatives through the Transportation Equity Act (see Chapter V). As of 2002, that 
amount represented an investment 100 times greater than from Canada's federal 
government131. Moreover, the latest federal direction does not represent the national 
transit strategy called for by the FCM, the CUT A, the Standing Senate Committee on 
National Finance, and others. While the new federal funding represents an increase in 
capital spending from 0% in 2001 to 18% in 2005 , it does not represent a long-term 
and dedicated urban transit strategy. Even the Council of the Federation, comprising 
provincial premiers typically resistant to federal encroachment, recommended in 2005 
that the federal government dedicate long-term and stable resources to urban public 
transportation133. 
2.2) Toronto - Ontario: 
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Even in this situation, where federal funding has not been typically available and 
municipalities are dependant on provincial support, provinces have not always provided 
consistent and reliable funding. As with housing, the Toronto experience offers some of 
the clearest lessons. 
Public transit in Toronto is managed by the Toronto Transit Corporation (TTC), 
the largest transit body in Canada. Prior to 1998, the TTC received about 75% of its 
capital investments in transit from the provincial government. In fact, since 1972 the 
provincial government had financed the bulk of both capital expenditures for the TTC but 
also shared the operating losses (the difference between revenues generated by fare intake 
and operating expenditures) with the City, covering up to 68% of the losses between 
1981 and 1993. At times, such heavy reliance on the provincial treasury produced 
undesired outcomes for the TCC, in that the provincial government would occasionally 
use its funding as leverage to influence the direction and decision making of the TTC134. 
But by 1998 those transfers had been eliminated by the Harris Conservative government 
in the disentanglement trade-off. The provincial government ceased to provide either 
capital or operating subsidies to the City for the maintenance of the TCC. The province 
also made the municipal government responsible for the transit systems' operating losses, 
which in 1998 were estimated to be $159M annually. At the same time, the Ontario 
government chose to expend considerable resources focussing on road networks to 
reduce traffic congestion, without consideration for reducing the amount of vehicular 
traffic135. 
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The capital transfers did return in 2001 under the Ontario Transit Renewal 
Program (OTRP). Although they had been redesigned to require matching funds, the 
investments ultimately helped to reduce the total municipal transfer to the TTC, which 
was - and is - largely supported through property taxes. The Province provided $62M 
under the program in 2002 and 2003, but reduced the amount to $51M in 2004 under a 
re-named OTRP, the Ontario Transit Vehicle Program. In 2005, a total of $69M was 
provided by the provincial government under a variety of programs, including the Transit 
Vehicle Program, a new Bus Replacement Program, the provincial component of the 
federal Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund (CSIF), and the province's SuperBuild 
program. In 2006, the provincial Liberal government introduced a 2 cent gas tax transfer 
to municipalities for public transit, and in 2007 announced the Move Ontario 2020 Plan, a 
$17B rapid transit plan for the Greater Toronto Area. Nevertheless, the current 
provincial component of the capital investments, $145M in 2006, represents only about 
30% of the capital subsidy budget (compared to 75% prior to 1998). 
At the same time, federal initiatives have begun to assist the TTC. In 2002 the 
Canada-Ontario Infrastructure program was launched, with the CSIF following the next 
year. With the commencement of the New Deal provision in 2004, the federal 
government proceeded to eliminate the municipal GST and provide a gas-tax transfer to 
municipalities, through the provinces. Thus, whereas in 2001 the federal government had 
provided zero funding to the TTC for its capital expenses, by 2006 the annual capital 
contribution was $166M. The federal government has not pursued operational subsidies 
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in addition to capital investments, however, and remains the only G8 country without 
such an operating subsidy. 
2.3) Vancouver - British Columbia: 
Vancouver is perhaps luckier than both Toronto and Montreal in that its current 
rolling transit stock is relatively new. The Sky Train system was not constructed until 
1985, in advance of Expo '86 and twenty years after Montreal hosted the same event for 
which its Metro was originally constructed. However, luck is only part of the picture. 
The city has developed, with the provincial government, effective regional coordination 
measures that appear to have ensured effective planning. As well, the provincial 
government in BC has taken innovative steps to ensure relatively consistent levels of 
funding for the city's public transportation provider, TransLink, and has not attempted to 
download or reduce funding substantially as a result of the downloading pattern of the 
1990s. Created by the provincial government in 1998, Translink oversees the city's Sky 
Train and bus system, as well as local roads and - interestingly - urban air quality. Until 
very recently, TransLink's board was largely appointed by the GVRD, with only three of 
fifteen members being appointed by the provincial government. 
Similar to the TTC in Toronto, TransLink's largest single revenue generating 
source is transit fares (36%), but the share is far less (see Figure 5.4). While property tax 
funding from municipalities in the GVRD is also a significant component of the agency's 
budget (28%), a 12 cent/litre tax on fuel sold within the GVRD and collected by the 
province for public transit purposes is also a significant source of funding. This tax, 
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which was implemented in 1999, currently accounts for 30.5% of TransLink's operating 
budget. In addition, TransLink receives about 6% of its budget from a combination of 
hydro levies on GVRD residents, and a sales tax on parking sites and non-metered paid 
parking in any GVRD municipality. The province does not contribute to the operating 
costs of TransLink other than to transfer these fuel and sales taxes to the Authority. 
Vancouver has also benefitted from federal funding for public transportation, 
although much of this funding has come by way of one time project-specific capital 
investment agreements, particularly in light of increased transit demands in advance of 
the 2010 Olympics. For example, in 2003, TransLink received $6.3M from the federal 
government (in addition to $1M from the province) to begin construction of a new Sky 
Train line connecting the downtown with the airport. In 2005 that federal contribution 
was increased to $108.9M, and in 2006 it was increased again to $125.6M. This federal 
funding in 2006 represents nearly 48% of the annual capital budget, and does not include 
the $114M in new funding provided through the New Deal that has already been 
earmarked towards the acquisition of new buses and Sky Train cars . 
Although the provincial government has had a comparatively smaller funding role 
in TransLink, the provincial government retains significant control over the operations 
and planning ability of the Authority, and has recently moved to re-emphasize its 
authority over the body. In October 2007 the Liberal government of Premier Gordon 
Campbell announced that it would move to reorganize the Authority to effectively reduce 
its autonomy and provide greater provincial government direction. The new legislation 
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makes the province responsible for the selection of board members, and requires that 
future capital planning be done by the province - not TransLink. The province 
developed this new legislation in reaction to a Review Panel's recommendations, which 
pointed out that there had been jurisdictional disputes among TransLink board members. 
While limiting the authority of TransLink, the legislation also proposes that the Authority 
be allowed to increase the fuel tax by a further three cents. 
Despite these recent changes, Vancouver stands out for having been notably 
successful in reducing the number of car trips within the city, in part by resisting the 
impulse to build major freeways in the city core, but also by concentrating on core 
development, particularly on the downtown peninsula. In fact, a recent issue of Canadian 
Geographic lauded Vancouver's approach to concentrated urban development as a 
'model' for other large cities, calling the city a 'showcase for sustainability' . This 
theme was echoed at the June 2006 World Urban Forum hosted by Vancouver . Even 
so, recent extension of the rapid public transit system in Vancouver was accomplished 
largely by the added impetus of the 2010 Olympic Games, which effectively ensured 
provincial and federal funding for an expansion that will include the airport. Other 
Canadian cities have been less successful at effective regional transportation 
management, and have been even less successful at securing such large one-time capital 
investments as Vancouver. And it must be noted that Vancouver has not altogether 
avoided sprawling development that mitigates against the effectiveness of rapid public 
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transportation systems . 
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2.4) Montreal- Quebec: 
Montreal's public transit experience appears - like housing - to be a mixture of 
the Toronto and Vancouver experience. Public transportation in Montreal is managed by 
the Societe de Transport de Montreal (STM), comprised of elected officials from the 
Montreal Urban Community as well as passenger representatives. Montreal's public 
transportation system is well developed and well used. In fact, more Montrealers use 
public transit than the inhabitants of any other city in Canada. On one day in 2005 the 
metro alone carried over 820,000 passengers140. However, Montreal also possesses some 
of the oldest rolling stock in the world, with many of its Metro cars having been in 
service for more than 40 years. New construction did not occur at all between 1988 and 
2006. Like Toronto and Vancouver, fares make up the largest proportion of the STM's 
operating budget (51%), followed by a contribution from the City of Montreal (36%), 
comprised largely of property tax revenues (see Figure 5.5). 
Until 1992, the provincial government subsidized the STM for its operating 
deficit, but changed its approach to provide a flat subsidy until 1995. In that year, in part 
as a reaction to the federal downloading exercise, the Quebec provincial government 
reduced its support for public transportation, similar to the Ontario exercise. This move 
effectively eliminated nearly $30M from the operating budget for public transportation in 
Montreal. The provincial government did not begin to fund operating expenditures again 
until 2005, when, in anticipation of a new provincial-municipal funding arrangement, the 
province provided a $10.8M subsidy to the STM. However, during the province's 
absence from operating subsidies, the STM estimates that over $83M was lost between 
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1992 and 2000 which, when combined with decreasing municipal transfers to the STM 
represented a 46% drop in public revenues141. 
Since that time, the provincial government has not returned significantly to the 
field of operating cost subsidies, although a variety of programs and subsidies continue to 
exist, largely for capital investments and not operating costs. For example, the provincial 
public transit assistance program entitles the STM to be reimbursed for 'admissible 
expenses' at rates ranging from 48% to 75%. The rates vary according to the type of 
equipment purchased, and the type of work undertaken (new development or 
refurbishment). Additional one-time capital investments have also been made, including 
$25M in 2005 for renovations to the city's deteriorating Metro cars, with a commitment 
from the province to absorb 75% of the projected $1.1B total cost for replacement of the 
rolling stock. Moreover in 2005, the Quebec government announced that $360M made 
available through the New Deal financing agreement with the province and the provincial 
infrastructure investment organization would go to the STM's investment expenditures. 
Lastly, the provincial government's Green Fund has a budget of $120M over five years to 
support public transportation projects, but is available to all transportation systems in the 
province. 
The only operating subsidy from the provincial government came in 2007, as a 
result of the provincial government's 2006 public transit policy. Under that policy, 
which recommended that Montreal specifically review the process by which Montreal 
and other local communities share in the financing of public transit, Quebec agreed to 
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subsidize the operating deficit of the smaller communities that are linked to Montreal's 
regional transit system, up to a maximum of 13% of the costs. 
Like British Columbia and (more recently) Ontario, Quebec has also pursued 
alternative tax sources to fund public transit initiatives, although these are limited at best. 
A 1.5 cent/litre tax (compared to 12 cents in BC) is applied to all gasoline purchases in 
the Montreal area and is directed towards the Agence metropolitaine de transport (AMT), 
which oversees the commuter train lines to Montreal's outer suburbs. An additional 
$49M annually is provided to the AMT from vehicle registration fees, a taxation source 
that was first introduced in 1996. Yet even with these investments in public 
transportation, the City of Montreal's 2007 transportation plan notes that nearly $8. IB 
over 20 years would be required to implement a modest transportation plan, in addition to 
the operating and maintenance expenditures currently required. 
2.5 Transportation Summary and Assessment 
Given the importance of public transportation in terms of the economy and the 
environment, as well as the aged state of public transportation infrastructure (particularly 
in Montreal and Toronto) all transit agencies reviewed here have noted their reliance on 
senior levels of government. Whether these governments have the capacity or desire to 
respond to greater urbanization and greater demands on public transportation is in 
question. And if the lessons of the 1990s are any indication, funding and support can be 
a function of both capacity and desire. New funding initiatives from the federal and 
provincial governments have generally undervalued the deteriorating state of public 
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transportation infrastructure. Where billions are ultimately required, millions are made 
available. The entire funding envelope of the New Deal gas-tax transfers - which are 
currently allocated across the country - could be put to use in any one city studied here. 
The CUT A, citing a Transport Canada assessment, suggests that there are a 
variety of policy goals that could be met through a national transit strategy. These 
include: improving traveller choice; keeping downtowns healthy; containing urban 
sprawl; improving air quality and health; and reducing greenhouse gas emissions142. As 
highlighted in table 5.8, the open federalism approach preferred by the current federal 
government cannot effectively address any of these goals, even though they are easily 
considered national policy concerns. The proposed approach of open federalism does 
nothing to prop up the New Deal with further stable funding, not does it guarantee an 
operating subsidy. Furthermore, open federalism would dismiss the notion of a national 
transit strategy aimed directly at public transportation. Such a strategy has been called 
for repeatedly by the likes of the FCM, the CUTA and, more recently, the reports of the 
Conference Board and the EACCC. As the evidence here suggests, both provincial and 
municipal governments are only partially equipped to deliver on these policy goals in the 
absence of federal participation. 
3) Summary — Public Housing and Public Transportation 
The two cases studies, combined, demonstrate the huge challenges facing 
Canada's municipalities and the variety and inadequacy of federal and provincial 
responses. More importantly, they demonstrate the difficulties in approaching complex 
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urban problems using an open federalism approach. Where such an approach advocates 
clear lines of jurisdiction, housing and transportation demonstrate that policy goals are 
often overlapped, intertwined, and inseparable. It is particularly striking that the federal 
government would not want to play a greater, sustained and ongoing role in public transit, 
given the federal government's overall responsibility for meeting environmental goals 
under international protocols. At the same time, public transportation contains policy 
goals for the province, in terms of enhancing regional linkages and facilitating commerce, 
and for the municipality in terms of attracting residents and reducing congestion. 
Moreover, the federal government's environmental goals are also equally important to the 
other levels of government. Similarly, it is unclear why the federal government would 
not be interested in making housing a national priority, given the increasing pressures on 
affordable housing and the limited progress made to date. 
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VI) INTERNATIONAL TRENDS: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
This chapter examines the state of urban affairs and municipal governance in two 
federal states (the United States and Germany), one confederation (the European Union) 
and, for the sake of a more full comparison, a unitary state (France). None of the 
countries surveyed here have escaped the need to reform the structures of urban 
governance to meet the challenges of the day, and their challenges reflect contemporary 
Canadian issues. Whether considering fiscal arrangements, intergovernmental relations, 
or areas of jurisdiction, the similarities among the countries reviewed are striking. At 
first blush, it appears that the German principle of subsidiarity, now enshrined firmly in 
European political structures, may prove to be the guiding rule for the future development 
of urban public policies. Insofar as accomplishing subsidiarity will require the attention 
and action of higher levels of government, the urban agenda will likely occupy the 
agenda of national and supra-national governmental organizations for some time. As 
well, it appears that international trends favour increasing interaction between and among 
levels of government as a means to resolving the challenges faced by urban centres. 
1) United States 
Not surprisingly, the situation in the United States is most similar to the situation 
in Canada. Also a federal state, the United States does not explicitly recognize municipal 
governments in its Constitution. Thus, municipalities are the legal responsibility of the 
state. However, municipalities in many states are governed by 'home rule'. Such cities 
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are free to develop their own charters and identify which areas of policy they are going to 
take responsibility for, so long as that area is not specifically legislated by the state. In 
other cases, however, 'Dillon's Rule' municipalities must have the express permission of 
the state legislature to act in a particular area of jurisdiction. 
Although there is a significant range in the fiscal levers available to municipal 
governments in the U.S., they generally have more significant resource generating 
capacity themselves, or through their corresponding counties, than Canadian urban 
centres. For example, many cities/counties can levy sales taxes, taxes on TV or 
telephone utilities, vehicle registration, etc. Thus, when infrastructure or other demands 
come up, the cities are slightly better equipped to deal with them individually without 
negotiation with other levels of government. It should be noted, however, that many US 
cities are calling for a review of municipal financing, since the availability of tax levers to 
finance local responsibilities is not homogenous among all states. These responsibilities 
are also not homogeneous among states and municipalities. While it is difficult to 
generalize, the range of areas over which U.S. municipal government have responsibility 
appears to be greater than in Canada. 
The federal government has limited constitution jurisdiction in urban issues, 
which are generally reserved for states or delegated to local authorities. Nevertheless the 
United States federal government has developed grants and other funding programs that 
has led to a greater involvement of the federal government in municipal affairs than is 
traditionally thought to be the case143. While the U.S. federal government indicated a 
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noticeable retreat from urban affairs under President Reagan, the Clinton Administration 
began to again expand the role of the federal government in municipal issues, but was 
careful to construct programs that were largely grant administration programs, not 
legislative encroachment into areas of municipal or state jurisdiction. Under Clinton, the 
federal government took the view that federal leadership in urban areas could be affected 
by establishing national standards with enough flexibility to allow states and municipal 
governments to choose their policy levers in order to achieve these standards. 
Furthermore, the federal government saw its role as monitoring local compliance with 
national goals, rather than acting as a partner in the development and management of 
individual programs144. To facilitate these principles, roughly $9 billion of a $24 billion 
federal transportation block grant was made available directly to larger municipalities 
(those with populations greater than 200,000), bypassing the state legislatures and their 
respective departments of transportation. This move was seen as important in that it 
allowed larger municipalities to direct the funds to mass-transit, rather than succumb to 
the highway-happy politics of state politicians145. 
The federal government has been most active in the areas of housing and 
transportation. For example, cities and counties can apply to the federal government's 
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), which sets 
aside over $250 billion over 5 years for transportation infrastructure. Its predecessor, the 
Transportation Equity Act, set aside $203 billion over six years for municipal 
infrastructure projects. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development offers an annual $5 billion community block grant for applicant cities, 
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among several other significant funding programs aimed at urban centres. Many of these 
grants are created specifically for designated cities - based on size or need - and funding 
is often transferred directly from the federal department to the municipal authority. As 
Vogel points out, in 2002-2003 federal funding constituted 8% of large city revenues146. 
In fact, the federal government has made so many grants available to applicant cities, it 
has created a web-based service to guide municipal authorities through the sometimes 
complex maze of grant applications. 
The current Bush administration has not entirely reversed the Clinton approach, 
but the focus has been changed from strictly urban to urban-security. In addition, 
President Bush and the Republican Congress (pre-2006) preferred to adhere to a federal-
state relationship, cutting mayors and other local officials out of the dialogue. Doing so 
has had adverse affects on municipal funding. The National League of Cities, the 
foremost organization representing municipal interests in the U.S., notes that in 2003 and 
2004 almost 50% of states had cut municipal funding. A 2004 survey of municipal 
officials facilitated by the League indicates that fiscal concerns are one of the primary 
concerns facing cities, compared to the 2000 survey, in which officials ranked their fiscal 
situation as having been the most improved aspect of their concerns147. The League has 
also recently produced a report arguing that the fiscal arrangements for municipalities in 
the United States are "woefully out of date"148, and no longer meet the demands placed 
on municipalities, even with their greater tax levers than Canada. The League places 
advocacy for federal funding at the top of its list of priorities for the coming years. 
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Thus, the future direction of the federal government in the United States will be 
particularly informative, since many of the pressures in urban America are similar to 
pressures in Canada. Lessons may be hard to take away, however, given the variation 
among states and their municipal governments with respect to fiscal ability and program 
responsibility. The point here is simply that rather than treat jurisdiction as absolute, the 
federal government appears to have been willing to adjust the processes of federalism to 
better meet the needs of urban centres than open federalism appears to do. 
2) Germany 
In Germany power is divided between the federal government and sixteen Lander. 
In many ways, the federal system has served Germany well, although many of the 
problems of federalism are clearly evident. As in other federal countries, there continues 
to be debate regarding the distribution of resources (the fiscal imbalance), and 
jurisdictional disputes over areas of responsibility are not uncommon. The additional 
problems of European integration also, perhaps uniquely to Germany, influence the 
debate between the Lander and the federal government. The sub-national units claim that 
many of the costs associated with the 'Europeanization' of responsibilities hurts them 
most, as national governments shift responsibilities downward in order to meet pan-
European criteria. 
Unlike in Canada, Germany's municipalities enjoy a long tradition of carrying 
significant responsibilities. In part, this tradition is due to a rational belief in 
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'subsidiarity', or assigning responsibility to the lowest level of government while 
maintaining fiscal and administrative coherence. Municipal responsibilities are seen to be 
enshrined in the Basic Law (constitution) of Germany, although with limitations. While 
Article 28 of the constitution guarantees a right to local self-government, it is limited to 
within the scope of the legislative framework outlined by the Land. Thus, while local 
governments are recognized in the constitution, local governments remain, for all intents 
and purposes, 'creatures' of the Lander - which determine the municipal boundaries and 
charters. Larger cites sometimes carry out the functions of both local levels - and indeed 
the responsibilities of the Lander, in the case of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. Local 
governments in Germany deliver a significant range of services (including social services 
and cultural activities), which can be either 'general purpose' (matters of a strictly local 
nature) or 'delegated' (broader services assigned by the Land to local governments). 
Nonetheless, the constitutional recognition of municipal self-government is often 
used by municipalities to challenge Land legislation in the courts, as was particularly the 
case throughout the territorial reforms of the 1970s149. Such challenges have not resulted 
in increased municipal roles, however. In fact, it is argued that the status of municipal 
governments in Germany is eroding150. Similar to the Canadian situation, Lander have 
been quick to speak on behalf of their respective cities in negotiations with the federal 
government. Unlike in Canada, however, Germany's three largest municipal associations 
(representing cities, towns and municipalities, and counties, respectively) often 
collaborate directly with the federal government and in fora such as the Financial 
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Planning Council and Economic Planning Council, among other institutions of the 
federation. 
The scope of local sources of revenue is much broader than in Canada. Municipal 
governments have access to a portion of personal income tax, taxes business profits, 
property taxes and payroll taxes. Unlike the U.S. and Canada, however, where property 
taxes are the primary source of municipal revenues, in Germany property taxes account 
for only about 9% of the total municipal budget. Taxes on profits and the municipal 
portion of the income tax account for roughly 82% of revenues, taken together, and are 
often transferred from collection agencies in higher levels of government. Of course, 
powerful industrial or commercial cities (such as Frankfurt and Stuttgart) have greater 
leverage of local funds through the business profit tax, but other areas may require more 
significant transfers from upper levels of government. 
Despite this range of tax sources, local governments face mounting debts. One 
report notes that in 2002 the total municipal debt in Germany was nearly $11 billion 
(US)151. There are increasing calls from both municipal actors and observers alike for 
reforms to allow municipalities to raise more of their own revenues, rather than sharing 
from generally collected revenues (such as income tax). The Lander, notably, are firmly 
against such fiscal reforms, which they see as eroding their own sources of revenue and 
transferring fiscal authority to lower levels of government. Such disputes among and 
between Lander and municipalities should be familiar to Canadian observers. An even 
broader range of reforms is currently under review. A joint Committee on Modernizing 
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the Federal System was struck in 2003, and tasked with considering the relationships 
among all levels of government. While it failed to reach a consensus in 2004, a new 
package with a major focus on municipal demands was proposed in 2005. It, too, has 
stalled, but local governments have been successful in receiving an assurance that federal 
responsibilities cannot be downloaded to municipal authorities. 
If lessons are to be taken from the German situation, it is that simple 
constitutional recognition within a federal system does not guarantee local autonomy or 
fiscal sustainability. The problems of jurisdiction, downloading, and fiscal authority 
endemic to federations have not been absent from Germany. However, the 'plight' of 
Germany cities should be measured against that which they already possess: active 
participation in many of the institutions of the federation, a climate in which debate on 
the structures of federalism is encouraged, access to a range of tax resources, and a high 
degree of policy interaction with other levels of government. 
3) European Union 
The EU has recognized the need to devote attention to local authorities rather than 
simply member states. Given the historical importance of cites (as demonstrated in both 
the French communes and German city-states noted above) in Europe, this development 
is not surprising. It is also unsurprising that individual regions began to form informal 
networks to advance their interests, given that many European regions carry local 
similarities and identities across state borders. These networks have become formalized 
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in recent decades, with the largest and most active being the 'Eurocities' network, which 
maintains offices in Brussels in order to monitor and collaborate with officials at the 
European Union. 
The role of such networks is expanding. As a result of increasing levels of 
'Europeanization', beginning with coal and steel and expanding into areas such as the 
environment and health, European initiatives began to implicate local governments as 
well as national governments. In addition to proposing and enshrining legislation and 
regulation that would ultimately be administered by local governments, municipal 
authorities were granted access to larger levels of grants and subsidies offered by the EU. 
By effectively coordinating with regional and national governments municipal authorities 
could influence the distribution of funding to local projects. Programs such as the 
European Regional Development Fund drive much of this networking. 
The Council of Europe also recognized early on the importance of local self-
government when it created, in 1957, the Standing Conference of Local and Regional 
Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). In 1994, the Council of Europe underwent restructuring 
and raised the profile of the CLRAE, moving it from a Conference to a Congress, a move 
that both increased the CLRAE's visibility within the Council and put it in a position to 
more effectively influence the Council's work. The CLRAE, comprising more than 
200,000 municipalities across Europe, has proposed several declarations on local 
autonomy to the Council (including the European Urban Charter and the Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation), but its greatest achievement to date has been the development 
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and approval the European Charter of Local Self-Governance, which was opened for 
signature in 1985. The Charter seeks to ensure the rights of local authorities - including 
ensuring administrative independence in areas of local jurisdiction, as well as some 
measure of fiscal autonomy. In keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, the Charter 
advocates that jurisdiction over public policy questions be given to the government 
closest to the constituents in question, and that municipal and regional governments are * 
equipped with the legal mechanisms through which to carry out their responsibilities and 
to ensure that democratic government continues at the level that is closest to European 
citizens (CoE). The Charter is in the process of ratification, the most recent being France 
on January 17, 2007, bringing the total to 27 states (incidentally comprising all European 
Union member states). 
The CLRAE remains active to this day, advising the Council of Europe on matters 
that affect both local and regional levels of government. The CLRAE's two 'chambers', 
one representing local authorities and the other representing regions, have been focussing 
on urban issues that are common across Europe (and, indeed, in North America as well), 
such as social cohesion and sustainable development. Given the factors influencing 
urban public policy identified in the overview, the CLRAE sees its role as evolving and 
increasing, balancing the demands of globalization with the nation-state and European 
political structures. 
One of the drawbacks of such a diverse set of interests across Europe is the 
tendency to have several groups competing for the same policy area. Within the EU, the 
Council of European Municipalities was created in 1951 (indeed, pre-dating the CLRAE, 
although it did not, and still does not, have nearly as much clout), which changed to the 
Council of European Municipalities and Regions in 1981. In addition, there are the 
Assembly of European Regions and the International Union of Local Authorities. The 
number of groups acting across Europe to influence supra-national institutions perhaps 
reflects the fact that municipalities are de facto increasingly involved in the process of 
Europeanization, particularly when seen in the context of globalization of trade networks 
and communication. 
As the European Union continues to expand the reach of the policy areas which it 
will address, it will undoubtedly find itself treading on municipal turf. Having moved 
from areas like steel and coal to areas such as health and the environment, the EU has 
moved from very specific issue areas to much broader ones, with implications on all 
levels of government across Europe. While the EU expands its reach, other levels of 
government are simultaneously restructuring and modernizing, which often entails 
transferring responsibility for policy areas to lower levels of government, particularly in 
those places most wedded to the principle of subsidiarity. EU policy expansion, 
therefore, coincides with policy devolvement, meaning that EU policy areas will 
increasingly be urban policy areas. In reaction to this trend, municipal governments may 
no longer be satisfied to observe EU activities or lobby from the outside. Rather, they 
may be inclined to exercise for direct participation in European deliberations as 
participant members. If so, the number of disparate pan-European urban-interest groups 
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may be reduced, as municipal authorities work to aggregate their interests on the 
European scene152. 
Such pressures have prompted the EU to work towards integrated models that 
incorporate the principle of Subsidiarity. Yet subsidiarity in this case does not exclude 
other levels of government, instead the practice has spawned an ethic of 'multilevel 
governance'153. Levels of government increasingly view public policy issues as 
opportunities to engage a number of partners horizontally, each with a particular 
constituency but focussed on the same problem. Going further, a recent study of 
European countries demonstrates that most are moving in the opposite direction of open 
federalism - towards explicitly outlining a national urban policy154. This is occurring in 
federal and unitary states. Notwithstanding structural differences, such as the historical 
authorities retained by many German cities, for example, such a trend appears to be the 
opposite of open federalism. 
4) France 
France is typically viewed as one of the most centralized unitary states in Europe, 
with most power and authority located in the national government. Its operation is 
generally regarded as being quite unlike federal states such as Canada, Germany and the 
U.S. However, recent trends and ongoing reforms indicate that France, too, has 
developed structures of governance that are not unlike a federal state155. An ongoing 
process of devolution and de-concentration of responsibilities has fostered greater local 
authority and autonomy within the unitary state. 
With respect to local authorities, France has a complex governmental structure, 
with-four levels of government: national, regional, departmental, and communal (moving 
from national to the most local - not necessarily by hierarchy). There are over 36,000 
communes in France, the majority with very small populations, and thus there are also a 
large number of inter-communal institutions that administer programs for more than one 
commune. Generally, communes are responsible for immediately local concerns - waste 
and water, libraries, museums, local roads, and the like. Departments, meanwhile, 
number far less, but are responsible for broader programs and services, including major 
roads, public transportation, and some social services such as housing. The regional 
councils, meanwhile, are the least well-funded, but often carry out important planning 
functions. Their role has been increasing due to the Europeanization of government 
structures, since the EU and other bodies tend to give grants to regional authorities. 
While each level of government is directly elected, their ability to make decisions 
and formulate public policy is typically viewed as limited. Indeed, new trends show that 
inter and intra governmental arrangements are the norm, so that no one level of 
government has complete policy responsibility over a particular issue156. Power is 
generally dispersed, such that each level has a central task or tasks, but the size of some 
of the smaller levels and the requirements put upon them often necessitate cooperation 
and collaboration with other levels to execute programs. Local authorities at all levels 
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are significantly dependant on transfers from the central government (accounting for 
between 35-40% of local budgets). Some local tax levers are available, including a 
portion of income taxes and a special taxe professionelle (a tax on business profits). In 
2004, reforms were introduced to attempt to reduce the role of the central government in 
financing municipal authorities. The result has been increased independence from the 
central government for communs and departments, but not for regional governments, 
which still receive 60% of their funding from the central government. 
Several attempts have been made to decentralize the government structure of 
France. The last major push came in 1982, as part of President Mitterand's pledge to 
return some degree of power to local authorities. These reforms, while significant, are 
typically viewed as part of a series of ongoing reforms that continue to decentralize both 
administrative and policy functions. In part, these reforms have been prompted by the 
need to rationalize and modernize the government structures at all levels. In that regard, 
some have viewed the reforms as simply legalizing informal practices that had been used 
for some time, and simply strengthening the accountability structures . Also m part, the 
reforms have been initiated in response to Europeanization processes, which apply the 
principle of subsidiarity. Since the broad reforms of 1982, any transfer of responsibility 
to another tier of government must be accompanied by the relevant fiscal transfer to 
administer the programs. Since many local administrators report to the central 
government, local authorities play an important role vis a vis the central treasury -
reporting and collecting information on monies spent. 
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The central government nevertheless directs much of its work through the 
Ministere des interieres, and has recently created the national agency for social cohesion 
and equal opportunity. Formed in the wake of the riots in Paris' suburbs, the new agency 
is recognition of the links between urban well-being and social harmony, with particular 
emphasis on housing. President Sarkozy, faced with another round of sub-urban rioting, 
recently turned again to this and other agencies to begin reviewing the problems faced in 
urban and sub-urban Paris. In part, this focus is a result of downloading experiments in 
the 1980s and 1990s that actually reduced the availability of affordable housing, even as 
demand increased. The government also seeks the advice of the conseil national des 
villes, a body comprising municipal officials - both elected and non-elected - on major 
urban policies. 
The complex intergovernmental relations in France are difficult to transcribe onto 
the Canadian experience. In France, municipal governments may have similar policy 
areas for which they are responsible, but this responsibility is less absolute than in the 
Canadian case. Overlapping layers of government mean that no one government trumps 
another, and cooperation among governments becomes necessary to deliver policy 
coherence. This development is important, since it recognizes that even in unitary states 
such as France there is significant room for structures that allow for greater local input 
into national policy and vice versa. 
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5) Summary: International Trends 
The evidence from the countries examined here, comprising federal, con-federal and 
unitary states, demonstrates a movement towards multi-level governance, or what has 
been referred to here by Leo as deep federalism. It appears that, when confronted with 
similar urban pressures as in Canada, national and supra-national governments elsewhere 
have opted to increase the degree of intergovernmental arrangements, not reduce them. 
Multi-billion dollar funding packages have been made available for urban areas in the 
United States, for example, even though municipal governments there already posses far 
greater fiscal and policy authority in most cases than in Canada. Even where reductions 
in intergovernmental relations are perceived to be taking place, as in Germany, municipal 
governments there retain significant fiscal and policy authority, and are far more active in 
the institutions of federalism than municipal governments in Canada. Moreover, cities 
throughout Europe are the likely beneficiaries of the affects of the principal of 
subsidiarity, which has been embraced by the European Union, and the tendency of 
European countries generally to have an explicit urban policy. 
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, by firmly 
sticking to a rigid constitutional reality - that municipalities are a provincial jurisdiction -
open federalism forces the federal government to subscribe to a narrow definition of its 
role with respect to Canada's urban issues. That is to say, as Berdahl points out, the 
constitution assigns municipal institutions to the provinces, but it does not follow that the 
problems facing municipalities are therefore not within the federal sphere of interest158. 
On the contrary, most observers point out that the scope of issues facing Canada's urban 
centres necessarily requires some federal involvement. As Seidle points out, the sheer 
cost of solving urban problems such as infrastructure necessitates, to some extent, federal 
funding159. And as this analysis has demonstrated, the complex nature of many urban 
issues increasingly involves the responsibilities of all levels of government. 
Certainly, the Harper Conservatives are at least partly aware of this. For example, 
their approach to issues such as crime (one of their top priorities) reflects their 
understanding that federal actions have urban consequences. As well, the Conservative 
commitment to continuing the provisions of the New Deal and continuing to focus on 
infrastructure through the Build Canada Plan demonstrates some grasp of the magnitude 
of the problems in Canada's cities. The Globe and Mail recently argued that the federal 
Conservatives actually have a decent record to stand on in terms of infrastructure funding 
generally, in sharp contrast to their rhetoric160. But the same editorial demonstrated the 
likely hazards of their insistence on clear lines of jurisdiction, noting that Finance 
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Minister Flaherty's refusal to even engage with mayors and the FCM amounted to a 
'sneer' that may have longer-term consequences. 
As currently structured, open federalism would limit the federal government's 
ability to articulate broader national policy goals in areas such as housing or public transit 
that are tailored to urban needs. Claiming that Ottawa has become involved in municipal 
areas where it has no jurisdiction and little expertise also appears to overlook the fact that 
such involvement was requested - repeatedly - by municipalities themselves, and to 
some extent by premiers (for example, within the context of Council of the Federation's 
call for greater federal funding for public transportation). 
Second, the open federalism approach to Canada's urban centres also goes against 
a growing consensus among urban observers. A long list of reports, as noted, have 
expressly advocated an increasing federal role in Canada's cities. This involvement 
ranges from viewing federal policy through an 'urban lens' (rather than the traditional 
jurisdictional lens), to an all encompassing federal urban strategy. Such 
recommendations are usually accompanied by calls for greater autonomy for Canada's 
municipalities, particularly the larger ones. The Harper government's promises to 
include municipalities in any discussions aimed at rectifying the fiscal imbalance could 
result in some further fiscal autonomy for cities, but given traditional provincial 
opposition to such measures that outcome is questionable. Simply transferring tax room 
from the federal government to the provinces would not necessarily translate into further 
tax levers for municipal governments. Nor would it imply that provinces would not 
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impose the kind of conditions on grants to municipalities that they decry from the federal 
government. Without a federal presence to ensure compliance and press for national 
standards, there is no guarantee that provinces would actually deliver on improving urban 
conditions. As well, it must be recognized that the scope of challenges presented by 
Canada's urban centres may well be greater than they can, or would like, to solve on their 
own. 
Third, open federalism has not built on the lessons of previous federal 
arrangements. Collaborative federalism has shown the risks of a too decentralized 
framework: increasing unilateralism, ideological differences in approach, and a 
patchwork of policies and programs that do nothing to reduce the disparity among 
provinces in terms of program delivery. Recalling Jeffrey's criticism of collaborative 
federalism161, provincial governments using federal funds for alternative projects or 
simply refusing to take up federal funding offers was the rule and not the exception. 
Open federalism currently offers no fall-back position should provinces fail to deliver 
programs and services - which they often do, as seen in the cases of housing and 
transportation. While several provincial governments have recently indicated their 
intentions to grant municipalities greater authority and flexibility - such as the Ontario 
government's recent changes to the Act governing the city of Toronto or the Quebec 
government's recent financing deal with Quebec municipalities - there is little 
permanency in these arrangements and the authorities they afford may be politically 
difficult to implement (such as new taxes). 
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Fourth, open federalism fails to recognize this shift in the global economy by 
adhering to jurisdictional allocations made in an entirely different era. It also appears to 
suffer from an internal logical inconsistency in this regard; open federalism assumes the 
federal government has the authority over the national economy, for example, yet at the 
same time asserts that municipalities are provincial jurisdiction. If the lessons Courchene 
and others point out are an indication, the national economy is occurring in 
municipalities, and it remains unclear how the federal government will ensure the success 
of Canadian cities in meeting national priorities without asserting any influence. 
Fifth, as the case studies in housing and transportation demonstrate, provincial 
responses to urban demands vary widely and do not constitute an effective, cohesive 
approach to urban pressures in Canada. In housing, the provincial government of Ontario 
made a hasty retreat from the policy area in the 1990s, precipitating an exacerbation of 
the housing issue and leaving Toronto scrambling to find alternatives. In Vancouver, the 
city and the GVRD play a role in the implementation of housing solutions, but funding 
and policy direction are determined solely by the province. And, while funding has been 
made consistently available, it has not matched the increasing need for housing solutions, 
and at times has been directed to areas outside the domain of housing proper. In 
Montreal, meanwhile, effective partnerships have not lessened the risk of housing stress 
or homelessness. 
Similar lessons can be taken from the area of public transportation. As the case 
study demonstrates, public transit initiatives have been beset by provincial withdrawal 
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and re-entry (Ontario and Quebec) and by the 'provincialization' of the public 
transportation authority in Vancouver. It is also noteworthy that government subsidies 
for operating expenditures remain low, notwithstanding some creative tax sources and 
funding schemes. Overall provincial funding remains low, and cannot, without sustained 
and targeted federal assistance, make up for the transportation infrastructure deficit. 
Open federalism does not have a direct impact on these gaps. Its proponents 
would argue that it allows for creative municipal and provincial financing measures by 
reducing their expenditures in other areas. But, it does not guarantee that any freed-up 
funding would, in fact, make its way to those urban areas that need it most. Revenue 
saved in other areas could be watered-down and spread out over a wide range of issues or 
programs. Such a watering-down of policies and programs directed at the pressing issues 
faced by urban areas has already occurred - the broadening of the New Deal provisions 
to include 'communities' is only one example. Without explicit program goals identified, 
housing and transportation, along with a host of urban issues, will likely continue to go 
unaddressed. 
Finally, open federalism flies in the face of trends elsewhere. Observers of 
Europe have noted that the future development of institutions within the European Union 
will likely include ever-increasing representation from cities and city-regions. As new 
issues emerge and authority to effectively deal with them is delegated, cities and regions 
may well begin to compete with sub-national units (such as the German Lander), 
effectively reducing their role in policy development and implementation. Such views 
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are complementary to the emergence of multilevel governance structures in Europe and, 
to some extent, the United States. As outlined in Chapter V, there is a growing tendency 
to move towards more - not less - intergovernmental cooperation in the face of mounting 
urban issues. 
There are no simple solutions in a country as complex as Canada. The traditional 
complexity of managing interdependence in Canada's federal context have only become 
more complex given the rising importance of our urban areas and the changing nature of 
the global economy. As Canada's cities will likely continue to lack constitutional 
recognition for the foreseeable future, the challenge is increasingly how to include them 
in the administrative processes of federalism. The current move towards open federalism 
does not reflect the growing consensus on urban issues, and presents little hope for 
already under-funded and struggling cities. It fails to recognize, as Leo puts it, that "city 
politics is part of a national political system and that the workings of this system are often 
best understood, not by looking at discrete levels of government, but by treating the state 
as a unitary phenomenon which has an impact on cities"162. 
Yet Canada is good at federalism, and our history of innovation provies us with 
significant clues as to the way forward. Municipalities have rarely been included in these 
innovations in the past, but that must not necessarily be the case. As municipal officials 
gain both confidence and voice (which they are) it is likely that the traditional back and 
forth between the federal government and the provinces will be replayed between 
municipalities and the provinces. Already, many cities have shown leadership in making 
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advances despite tepid provincial and federal attention. Notably, some have developed 
their own 'green' funds and action plans to develop and sustain better environmental 
practices. Vancouver runs an Environmental Grant Program, while Toronto has 
established the Toronto Atmospheric Fund. Both are designed to encourage innovative 
solutions to environmental problems, and both serve as leading examples to other 
municipalities . Often, by providing initial funding, projects are better able to secure 
funding from other levels of government. Thus, future innovations will likely include 
municipal governments, and here open federalism has properly identified municipalities 
as consultative partners in some federal initiatives, such as efforts to rectify the fiscal 
imbalance. Where open federalism fails is its insistence on pulling back to traditional 
and constitutional definitions of jurisdiction and authority. It fails to recognize the power 
of federal leadership in achieving national goals, and that such leadership must not only 
be exercised within the framework of the constitution. In this regard, open federalism 
ignores the successes of cooperative federalism and the failures of collaborative 
federalism. The failures of the collaborative federalism era, in particular, are key 
developments in the assessment of the likely outcomes of an open federalism approach 
that relies on independent provincial responses to national concerns. 
What is required is perhaps a modified return to cooperative federalism, akin to 
the deep federalism presented by Leo. There is nothing in law that would prevent the 
federal government from creating national programs to address urban issues, and 
allowing for provinces or municipalities to opt out with compensation provided a 
program with similar objectives is in place. Simply transferring tax room to other levels 
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of government and hoping for the best would be contrary to the fact that Canada's cities 
are the 'nexus'164 of many indicators of national health and prosperity. It would also 
result in a further decentralization that goes against trends elsewhere. Engaging in the 
techniques of cooperative federalism, where federal leadership features prominently but 
not exclusively, and where tri-lateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms are in 
place, would allow a simultaneous centralization-decentralization dynamic. For the 
federal government, it would mark a return to its role of protecting the national interest -
and successful cities are clearly a national interest. For the provinces and for 
municipalities it could open more avenues for innovative policy development, open new 
avenues for funding to address shortfalls, and stands to better recognize the paradoxical 
upward and downward movement of economic power in glocalization. 
Canadian federalism has often focussed too much on questions of jurisdiction. 
Yet, as Hueglin notes, some original federalism theories focussed not on the question of 
"who has the right to do what", but rather was seen as "procedural principles that are 
meant to answer questions about who should best do what, and to what extent, in order to 
ensure the fairest outcome for all"165. Open federalism, with its focus on spheres of 
jurisdiction and competencies within those spheres, does not live up to such a 
conceptualisation. An updated form of cooperative federalism may, when appropriately 
combined with multi-level governance principles and whole-of-government approaches 
to complex public policy issues, provide for a more effective intergovernmental 
framework to ensure the sustainability of our urban areas in this urban age. 
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ANNEX A: FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1.1: Rural-Urban Trends in Canada (1851-2001): % Population 
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 Without a significant depth of policy initiatives to date, the Charter perhaps best reflects the open 
federalism concept. 
2
 These agreements were designed and implemented during the collaborative era, but reflect the idea of 
deep federalism given their reliance on all levels of government, the attention to local interests and the 
shared cost mechanisms in place to support them. 
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Table 4.2 Municipal Revenue Sources (% of Municipal Budget) 
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Figure 5.1: Ontario Co-operative & Non-Profit Housing Starts 1990-2004 
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Source: ONPHA, 2005 
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Figure 5.3: TTC Operating Budget 2006 
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Figure 5.4: TransLink Operating Revenue Sources 2006 
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Figure 5.5: STM Operating Revenue Sources, 2006 
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Table 5.7: Public Housing Policy Goals (FCM) and Open Federalism 
Policy Goal 
National Housing Strategy 
Meet long term rental 
demand 
Meet needs in growing 
communities 
Ensuring that new rental 
supply is suitable and 
affordable 




Renovating and adapting 
existing buildings 
Likely outcome of open federalism approach 
No national housing strategy. Funding for public housing to 
remain jurisdiction-specific and subject to ideological swings. 
No long-term approach. Funding for long-term rental programs 
subject to provincial funding and policy priorities 
Overall needs will remain unmet, let alone the particular needs of 
fast-growing centres. 
Suitability and standards left to municipal and provincial law. 
Affordability unaddressed except insofar as tax incentives may 
reduce burden. 
Special needs housing largely a provincial concern, to be 
addressed in the context of provincial priorities, except for 
Aboriginal housing (federal jurisdiction). 
No guarantee that disadvantaged communities will receive 
support. 
Only federally owned existing stock may be renovated, other 
existing stock maybe renovated subject to available provincial 
and municipal funding. Criteria for adapting existing buildings 
to incorporate more public housing likely left to municipalities. 
Table 5.8: Public Transportation Policy Goals (CUTA) and Open Federalism 
Policy Goal 
National Public Transit 
Strategy 
Improving traveller choice 
Keeping downtowns healthy 
Containing urban sprawl 
Improving air quality and 
health 
Reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Likely outcome of open federalism approach 
No national public transit strategy. Funding for public 
transportation to remain largely through fares and property taxes. 
N/A 
Without significant federal funding, new transit lines may be 
passed up in favour of existing infrastructure repairs, without 
bringing new passengers into downtowns. 
Urban sprawl is a provincial and municipal responsibility, and 
both have largely failed historically. 
Funding for new technologies or improved systems that 
contribute to better air quality remains limited. Provincial and 
municipal funding has tended to favour car-use. 
Same as above. 
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